Why do organizations choose to use nonviolence? Why do they choose specific nonviolent tactics? Existing quantitative work centers on mass nonviolent campaign, but much of the nonviolence employed in contentious politics is smaller scale nonviolent direct action. In this article, we explore the determinants of nonviolence with new data at the organization level in self-determination disputes from 1960 - 2005. We present a novel argument about the interdependence of strategy choices among nonviolent options in self-determination movements. Given limitations on their capabilities, competition among organizations in a shared movement, and different resource requirements for nonviolent strategies, we show that organizations have incentives to diversify strategies rather than just copy other organizations. The empirical analysis reveals a rich picture of varied organizational strategy choice, and a complex web of interdependence among strategies.

Prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, 2016. 
Draft: do not cite without permission.
Recent attention to the efficacy of mass nonviolent campaign has focused attention on the widespread use of nonviolent resistance around the world. For example, the Bil’in Popular Committee (in a Palestinian village divided by an Israeli-built wall) has garnered international attention for their diverse resistance repertoire, including documentary films and art installations, in addition to more traditional tactics of marches and sit-ins. More broadly, the cascade of uprisings during the Arab Spring demonstrated the power of nonviolent protest. The catalyst, Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation in Tunisia in December 2010, was followed by popular demonstrations that toppled leaders in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. In addition to rallies, boycotts have been used to voice dissent ahead of Bahrain’s 2014 elections and by Western Sahara activists campaigning in 2010 against Moroccan occupation. The recent use of mass nonviolent campaign as a tool of political dissent in the Middle East has increased scholarly and popular attention to nonviolent movements, with a marked emphasis on trying to understand when and why mass nonviolent campaign occurs and when nonviolence is likely to be successful.

Despite recent emphasis on the nonviolent character of these social movements, many movements are multifaceted and complex. Social movements often comprise different organizations and these organizations often use a variety of different tactics—some nonviolent, some violent, and some that we might consider conventional political behavior. In some cases, as in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, these activities reach the level of a sustained nonviolent campaign or civil war, but in a greater number of cases, organizations like the Bil’in Popular Committee engage in smaller nonviolent or violent actions. While many studies have examined the use of violence in a range of forms (irregular war, terrorism, suicide attacks, etc.), relatively few have addressed questions about the use of nonviolence. Why do organizations choose to use nonviolence? Moreover, why do they choose specific nonviolent tactics?
This article contributes to the literature by advancing a novel argument about strategy interdependence. Nearly all studies that examine dissident strategies across organizations have centered on a diffusion logic, wherein the use of a strategy by an organization promotes its use by others (Bloom 2005; Cunningham et al. 2012). We argue interdependence can also manifest as diversification, wherein organizations choose strategies that differ from those used by other organizations. Strategy diversification is the result of organizations considering their own capabilities, the mobilization needs of different strategies, and a desire to remain a visible part of the dispute when other organizations are active. These alternative logics (of direct diffusion or diversification) are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as both processes can occur simultaneously in a movement (i.e. organizations can respond to incentives that generate direct diffusion and diversification in the same movement). Yet, the assumptions that organizational strategic choices are independent of those of other organizations representing the same movement, or that diffusion always dominates in environments with many actors, have been essentially untested to date.

We analyze diffusion and diversification of non-violent strategies using new data on the yearly behavior of over 1,100 organizations that have been active in movements for greater national self-determination from 1960 - 2005. The data provide information on the use of five different types of nonviolent actions including economic noncooperation, protest and demonstration, nonviolent intervention, social noncooperation and political noncooperation, as well as information on the use of violence by these organizations. This is the first actor-based global dataset on the use

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1 We use the term “movement” to refer to collective mobilization around the same cause. We use the term “campaign” only with respect to nonviolent campaigns as defined by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) as a “series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective.”
of a variety of types of nonviolent dissent. As we describe at length below, there is a great deal of
diversity in organizational strategies even within the broad category of nonviolence.

**Studies of strategies of resistance**

Existing studies of political mobilization tend to focus on particular types of action, such as
terrorism (Crenshaw 1981; Pape 2005; Young and Findley 2011), protest (Francisco 1996; Beaulieu
2014; Boulding 2014), rebellion (Gurr 1970; Scott 1976; Skocpol 1979), or civil war (Fearon and
Laitin 2003; Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom 2004; Walter 2009; Cederman et al. 2013). Less
commonly, scholars focus on strategies as somewhat interchangeable (Moore 1998; Cunningham
2013), and theoretical models exploring the effect of repression have emphasized the role of
substitution (Lichbach 1987). Asal et al. (2013) utilize the Minorities at Risk Organization Behavior
(MAROB) project, which includes organization-level data on violence and nonviolence, but not on
different types of nonviolence.

The study of strategic nonviolence has largely been conducted without incorporating
alternative strategies of resistance. Work specifically on the use of non-violence has focused on how
to engage in nonviolent resistance (Martin 1984; Sharp 2005), descriptions of nonviolent campaigns
(Ackerman and DuVall 2001), the normative implications of non-violence (Gan and Holmes 2005),
or the efficacy of non-violence (Bond 1988; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Departing from the
single-strategy focus, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) allowed that mobilization can develop into

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2 See Davenport (2007) on the repression and dissent literature. See Koopmans (1993) on the
interplay between repression and success in dissident choices.

3 See Chenoweth and Cunningham (2013) on why non-violence has gotten limited large-n empirical
attention in conflict studies until recently.
predominantly nonviolent campaigns or violent campaigns (civil wars), but their study focuses exclusively on large-scale, mass mobilization.

Recent work, largely on violent conflict, has emphasized that groups challenging the state are frequently internally divided, which can lead to divergence of strategies of contention. Other types of mobilization are similarly subject to internal divides. Yet, the emphasis in these works tends to limit analysis to types of actors designated by strategy choice (i.e. rebels or political parties) and thus excludes the possibility of exploring how and when complex actors employ a range of strategies, or the effects that strategy choice can have among a set of linked actors.

The literature on social movements has more explicitly incorporated the idea of the same “movement” splitting on the issue of strategy. Haines (1984) highlights movements that split between radicals and moderates (such as the women’s movement, the anti-nuclear movement, and Black nationalism in the United States), emphasizing the role that a “radical flank” can play in strengthening the bargaining position of more moderate actors. However, the designation of radical or moderate is often linked to the strategies that individuals or organizations use, with a presumption that once an organization becomes “radical” it will continue to play this role. That is, the “radical” flank will employ violence, while moderates will eschew violence or at least embrace nonviolent or conventional political strategies.

Do the strategy choices of organizations influence one another beyond the context of violent contention, where competition is assumed to be the driving force? This question remains unexplored for three reasons. First, the emphasis on single strategies and the role of competition among organizations has not expanded to look at nonviolent contention. Second, when scholars focus on strategy diversity, it is typically defined as violence or non-violence, with little to no exploration [4 See Pearlman and Cunningham’s (2012) special issue on fragmentation in Journal of Conflict Resolution.}
of the variety of nonviolent tactics used. Third, the burgeoning academic study of non-violence has centered on mass nonviolent campaign, which tends to obscure the role of choice by organizations in favor of understanding the overall trajectory of a movement for political change. This is in part because of the lack of data on the use of nonviolence at the actor level. Leveraging our new dataset, which focuses on individual organizations and their use of a set of different nonviolent strategies, we are able to address this question in ways that have not been possible before.

**Decisions about strategy**

How are strategy decisions made? Opposition strategies are a collection of individual choices (i.e. does an individual suicide bomb, or join a protest?), yet the collective action observed in social movements is not generally spontaneous. Rather, it is typically coordinated. This coordination drives our focus here on organizations. Organizations engage in some deliberation about strategy, whether that entails just elites sitting at a table together, or decision-making processes that incorporate members more explicitly.

For example, the movement for greater self-determination in West Papua in Indonesia brought together people with a diverse set of preferences over strategy and there are clear instances of work being done to shape the debate on strategy. Macleod (2014) argues that “training and education have enabled Papuan activists and leaders to reflect on how they wage the struggle, conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the relative effectiveness of different methods…passionate discussions about analysis, targets, goals, strategy, and tactics, and how to wage conflict are ongoing (71).”

Likewise, intense debate characterized the evolution of strategy choice among Catholic organizations in Northern Ireland. Internal debate over strategy led to the 1992 publication of “Towards a lasting peace in Ireland,” a document which lays out a plan for sustainable peace, which
some suggested had “tacit approval” of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (Kennedy-Pipe 1997:154). Finally, even among organizations that are firmly committed to nonviolent strategies, organizations debated the merits and effectiveness of particular strategies. The Otpor movement to remove Milosevic in Serbia had a central office in Belgrade where major strategy decisions were made, but the disaggregated structure of the organization promoted autonomy among local branches in making strategy choices within the framework on nonviolence (Nikolayenko 2012). This allowed local activists to weigh in on strategy choices and respond to different local contexts.

As with violence, there are a number of options organizations can choose from when engaging in nonviolence. Organizations can organize protests, blockades, and strikes. Individuals in the organizations can participate in hunger strikes, walkouts, and work stoppages. Empirically, we see wide variation in the strategies organizations choose, and existing work tells us little about why they employ these different strategies.

In this article, we focus on how the actions of other organizations in the same movement affect strategy choices. We begin with a simple model of the organization’s decision process. Organizations have some maximal goal they pursue, such as regime change or secession. Adherence to this maximal goal is the primary way that organizations are linked within a social movement. That is, all organizations in a movement seek the same overall goal of greater national self-determination, even if their methods or particular preferences diverge.

Organizations pick strategies they think will work to achieve their goal, but in most cases, the maximal goals are a long term prospect, and their strategy choices will also be driven by more proximate concerns. Proximate goals for organizations include attracting and retaining supporters, gaining internationals and domestic attention or support, and demonstrating mobilization capacity. When there are multiple organizations in the same movement, there is an innate degree of competition among them (c.f. Pearlman 2008/2009, Cunningham et al 2012, Nameth 2014).
Because organizations seek the same maximal goal, they compete in broad terms for things like constituent support, funding, international support, and recognition. Organizations, then, pursue their shared maximal goal but often must seek these more proximate goals in the context of organizational competition within the movement.

Given this context of seeking both maximal and proximate goals, each organization is constrained in its strategy choices by its capabilities. Some organizations have extensive links within the community and can mobilize large amounts of people quickly. Others have fewer but very committed members that are willing to take personal risks. Organizations need to mobilize individuals to successfully employ any particular strategy, and what is needed will vary considerably by strategy. One of the limitations of the prior focus on mass nonviolent campaign and protest is that these strategies rely heavily on the mobilization of many people to succeed. Protests are not typically seen as effective if participation is very low (c.f. deNardo 1985). However, many other nonviolent strategies do not require a multitude of participants to be successful. Blockades, for example, can be effective with few individuals.

A strategy may be useful for an organization, regardless of whether it leads directly to success in achieving the movement’s aims, if it helps the organization to attain proximate goals. For pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong, for example, the substantial domestic support and international attention garnered by the 2014 protests may be viewed as a success despite the lack of significant concessions from China. Moreover, having more participants does not always make a more powerful statement. The impact of the Unknown Protester who stood in front of a column of tanks at the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 would not necessarily have increased with additional participants. Indeed, the standoff would likely have played out quite differently if others stood next to him.
Organizations will pick nonviolent strategies based on the resource needs of the strategy and what resources they anticipate they can mobilize. Resources available to organizations will determine, in part, their capacity to engage in different strategies to challenge the state (Olson 1971, Snow et al. 1986, and Tarrow 1998). In the literature on violent conflict, different mobilization needs have been recognized as a factor driving choice among violent strategies. For example, both scholarship and popular culture have suggested that terrorism is a “weapon of the weak” (c.f. Crenshaw 1981, Pape 2005, Butler and Gates 2009), and that individuals and organizations resort to terrorism when they lack the resources to pursue other strategies of violence.

**Organizational interdependence and strategy choice**

We have laid out a simple framework for organizational strategy choice, emphasizing that organizations have both maximal and proximate goals, are limited by their capabilities, and often operate in the context of implicit competition among organizations in a shared movement. We argue that this competition for shared, typically limited resources means that organizations must consider what other organizations are doing when picking a strategy (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). In some cases, the limited pool of resources is dictated by a bounded set of individuals that can identify with the cause (such as self-determination groups). Yet, even in cases without a bounded identity group,

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5 The literature on social movements identifies two other factors that determine the overall success of a movement’s strategy: framing and political opportunity structure (Kitchelt 1986). The movement’s frame is the way organizations make claims and position their cause. Organizations act strategically to create a specific narrative in pursuit of their objectives. Tarrow (1998) sees frames as a critical way that organizations give people something to identify with, thus enabling recruitment of participants.

6 See Wood (2010) on capacity and civilian abuse in violent contexts.
all movements face resource constraints. Only a subset of individuals will be willing to mobilize, and among those, each person will have a limited amount of time, attention and energy they are willing to devote to the cause.

There is a body of literature that has demonstrated that certain types of strategies diffuse (Butcher et al. 2015). Strategies are likely to diffuse when organizations believe there is a dominant (or most successful) strategy for gaining and retaining supporters. A well-known presentation of this logic is the outbidding model of terrorist behavior, wherein each terrorist organization chooses increased terrorist activity (particularly suicide bombing) in order to gain supporters (c.f. Bloom 2005), and organizations learn what is successful by observing others using the strategy. This diffusion due to competition can also alter organizational choices related to other strategies. Gleditsch and Rivera (2015), for example, have demonstrated spatial diffusion of mass non-violent campaigns. When a particular strategy appears to be gaining attention or attracting participants, organizations have an incentive to copy the strategy in order to capitalize on its perceived success. This direct diffusion of a strategy manifests as an increase in other organizations using the same strategy.

Typically, scholars examine diffusion as the spread of one type of action, such as civil war or suicide bombing (i.e. direct diffusion of a strategy). We develop an alternative for understanding interdependence of nonviolent strategy choices, what we call strategy diversification. Building upon the framework laid out in this article, we argue that resource constraints and needs intersect with the proximate goals of organizations to create more complex incentives for organizations than a simple drive to do what others do. Simply put, organizations can achieve some of their proximate goals more efficiently by diversifying strategies rather than copying other organizations.

Because organizations have different capabilities, and different strategies of nonviolence require different resources, some organizations will be better placed to capture the market for
strategies like protest or electoral boycotts. When another organization, perhaps with more limited resources, observes successful use of such strategies, they have an incentive to shy away from them because they will anticipate being unable to mobilize adequate participation. We assume that individuals have some amount of effort they are willing and/or able to devote to the cause, and will not typically support many different organizations working within the same movement. Organizations could just choose not to act at all. However, withdrawing from participation means that the organization not only does not further the cause, but also will fail to gain any meaningful say if concessions are forthcoming.

Instead, organizations can diversify by choosing to engage in strategies with low resource needs, but that keep attention focused on the organization and its goals. By employing a non-resource intensive strategy, such as small blockades or hunger strikes, organizations can use a strategy that is complementary to what other organizations are doing, but bring attention to the organization’s effort. Moreover, organizations can attempt to differentiate themselves by using strategies that others are not employing. As the only organization that employs hunger strikes, for example, they can seek to influence the dispute through their uniqueness. Moreover, the use of low-resource strategies can allow organizations to demonstrate deep commitment to the movement by putting members directly in harm’s way or even sacrificing them to the cause. As such, organizations can show that they are a force in the dispute, even if they cannot compete with other organizations in terms of mass mobilization.

Existing arguments suggest that organizations are more likely to use nonviolence when other organizations are using nonviolence. This follows from organizations competing for supporters and

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7 Even in situations where the nonviolent action is inaction (such as stay-aways and economic boycotts), individuals will feel as if they have done their part for the cause, and not necessary devote more time and effort to other types of mobilization.
modeling what appears to be successful strategies of others. Yet, that conceptualization does not take into account the resource needs of strategies or variable capacity of organizations to mobilize people. However, the resource needs of particular strategies, and other organizations’ resource consumption intersect to shape strategy choices. Specifically, organizations face resource constraints that can make high resource strategies unattractive, and low resource strategies more attractive. This leads to four main implications that we test. The first hypothesis is about direct diffusion of a strategy; the subsequent hypotheses relate to diffusion through diversification. In laying out this argument, we suggest that the diffusion of “nonviolence” as a strategy is actually the product of two distinct processes – direct diffusion and strategy diversification among nonviolent actions.

H1: The probability of an organization using a strategy increases as other organizations use that strategy.

H2: The probability of an organization using a high resource strategy (population intensive) decreases as other organizations use high resource strategies.

H3: The probability of an organization using a low resource strategy (non-population intensive) increases as other organizations use high resource strategies.

H4: The probability of an organization using a low resource strategy increases as other organizations use low resource strategies.
Empirical exploration of organizational use of nonviolence

We test these hypotheses using our new data on all organizations active in disputes over self-determination (SD) around the world, from 1960 to 2005. We examine SD disputes because they are a unique testing ground. Organizations working within a movement for greater national self-determination share the overarching goal of greater self-rule. These disputes typically remain “active” in the sense that organizations make claims for greater self-determination regardless of whether there is a spike in violent or mass nonviolent activities. As such, organizations in SD disputes allow us to look at the strategies chosen to challenge the state in a very broad context, and without the possibility that we artificially restrict organizations’ choice sets by looking only at periods of violence or mass non-violence.

The sample includes 138 different SD movements in 77 countries, ranging from the Sami in Sweden to the Moros in Philippines and Chechens in Russia. Some SD movements, such as the Zulus in South Africa and Tajiks in Uzbekistan, are represented by one single organization. In contrast, 61 organizations represented the Kashmiri Muslims in India, and 39 represent the Corsicans in France over the time period of the study. The full dataset features 1,124 organizations. The original identification of organizations comes from Cunningham (2014). To be included in the study, an organization had to represent the SD movement and make demands on the state explicitly related to self-determination.8

8 The initial compilation of the organizations list used the following sources: Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP), Minorities At Risk (MAR) profiles, Keesing’s Record of World Event and Lexis Nexis Academic news sources. It employed search terms related to self-determination demands, including the self-determination group and country names, and one of the following: autonomy, self-determination, self-governance, self-rule, federalism, and independence. See the appendix for more detailed information on the coding process to generate the list of organizations.
This dataset is novel in three ways. First, the unit of analysis is the organization, identified without regard to its strategy choice. Existing studies typically identify actors based on their dominant strategy (i.e. rebel groups, terrorist groups, protesters). By starting with an ex ante identified set of actors that were coded with respect to their demands rather than strategy, we are able to create a unique dataset where actors’ strategy choices vary widely. Second, moving beyond mass nonviolence, we code a variety of types of nonviolent actions, which we elaborate on next. Finally, we identify these nonviolent actions in a variety of different contexts including during periods of peace, civil war, and mass nonviolent campaign. This allows us to look broadly at strategy choice rather than focusing only on periods of mass mobilization, whether that mobilization is violent or nonviolent.

Nonviolent action

Building on Sharp (1973), as well as the work of other nonviolence scholars and practitioners (such as Ackerman and Duval 2001), we code unique data at the organization-year level for each organization in the data set. For each organization, the strategy dummy is coded as 1 if the organization was found to use that particular strategy in a given year. The action must be either organized by the organization, or we find evidence that people from the organization are publically participating in the action.

- **Economic noncooperation** includes strikes, tax refusals or consumer boycotts.
- **Protest and demonstration** includes rallies, protests, or demonstrations.
- **Nonviolent Intervention** includes sit-ins, occupations, or blockades.
- **Social noncooperation** includes hunger strikes, self-immolation or other self-harm.
- **Political noncooperation** includes organizational boycotts of elections or withdrawals from political office or coalition in the government.
For an event to be classified in one of these categories, the SD organization or their identified supporters must participate in the action. We also code an indicator for the use of violence by an organization against the state.

We identified events by reviewing five sources utilizing different methods of compiling information about organizational behavior. Lexis Nexis, Factiva, and Keesing’s Record of World Events pull English-language news articles, while the Minorities at Risk Database (MAR) and the Uppsala Conflict Database Program (UCDP) are constructed by third parties and draw from multiple types of sources. Activity by self-determination organizations in the dataset was reviewed in these sources for each observation. Indicators for each strategy are dichotomous, so once evidence of a strategy was found in an organization-year observation, coders moved on to find evidence of that strategy in the next year. This process was repeated for each strategy of interest. The dataset relies on event-level data to identify violent and nonviolent behavior by self-determination organizations, but does not include a count for the number of events in each category of action.9

Our method faces several challenges in terms of reporting bias, source reliability, information availability, and assumptions regarding actors. First, the quality and volume of reporting varies across cases. For example, high-profile events, countries, and personalities receive the most news coverage. Furthermore, the quality of reporting varies such that there is a great deal of information available in some cases but not others. Where we have less information about organizational behavior, Type II errors are more likely. For this reason, we rely on all five sources identified above to collect event data rather than a single news stream.

9 Temporally disaggregated events data would provide greater leverage on strategy choices, but would be extremely resource intensive to code for a global sample. We gave primacy to coverage of cases and time in this study.
Secondly, source reliability is a concern for any researcher. Journalists often cite sources who may have reason to conceal or exaggerate the truth, which biases reporting of events. Reporting bias affects our coding process by increasing the likelihood of Type I or Type II errors. For this reason, we did not rely solely on journalists' accounts of events. MAR and UCDP help to balance reporting bias as these sources are based on additional secondary source information in many cases (such as books and scholarly articles).

A third limitation concerns the scarcity of information. Some reports offer a veneer of detail, preventing confirmation of targets involved or of activity performed. Additionally, event records across most countries are scarcer before 1990. Scarcity of information increases the likelihood of a Type II error. We use multiple sources with different time frames and content to try to address this limitation.

Finally, we make certain assumptions about actors that simplify the relationships within and between organizations. For the purpose of our coding, and to allow a full range of strategy options of all organizations, we consider self-determination organizations that are nominally distinct from one another. For example, we treat the political and military wings of the ETA in Spain as separate organizations. Additionally, because we create a dichotomous indicator, we do not assess the proportion of effort allocated to different types of strategies in any given year.

Despite the challenges of collecting this type of data, the nonviolent actions dataset provides an important corrective for conflict scholarship that has focused primarily on violence or mass nonviolent campaign. The strategies captured in this dataset represent a set of vital and often overlooked strategies of resistance.
Organizations and Strategies

These new data demonstrate a great deal of variation in the strategies employed by organizations. Over the course of the study’s time period, more organizations used non-violence than violence. As many as 401 organizations (35.7%) engaged in nonviolent activity in at least one year. Only 275 organizations engaged in violence against the state (24.5%), while 376 organizations (33.5%) engaged in any sort of violent action. Among the 138 self-determination movements, 96 (69.6%) had at least one organization using nonviolent strategies and 103 (74.64%) had at least one organization using violence.

While many studies characterize organizations as violent or not, we find that 186 organizations (16.6%) engaged in both violent and nonviolent action. The widespread occurrence of organizations using a diversity of strategies is impossible to observe without this organization level data on a breadth of different organizations.

Among organization-year observations where nonviolence is used, we only observe one type of nonviolent action in a given year 74% of the time. There are only two instances of an organization engaging in all nonviolent strategies within a single year: Hamas in 1992 (Palestinians) and the All Party Hurriyat (Freedom) Conference (APHC) representing the Kashmiri Muslims in India in 1998.

To illuminate the relative use of different types of nonviolent strategies Figure 1 shows the frequency of observations (as a percent of all observations) in each category for three levels of aggregation of the data. The first panel is the share of organization-years out of the 12,012 organization-years in the study. The second panel is the percent of organizations over the entire study period (out of 1,124 organizations). The third panel is the percent of self-determination groups (out of 138 groups active from 1960 to 2005).
Examining the organization-year data, protest and demonstrations (9.59%) are by far the most frequently used when compared to other strategies (which range from 1.5% – 2.6%). Looking at each organization for the duration of its activity reveals that almost one third of organizations participated in a protest or demonstration at some point. Aggregating by self-determination group, the proportion using protest or demonstration jumps as high as 62.32%. Other nonviolent strategies are revealed to be popular when aggregating to the group level as well; 28.26% of groups use economic noncooperation, 35.51% use nonviolent intervention, 27.54% use social noncooperation, and 37.68% use political noncooperation.
Figure 1. Strategy frequency
Empirical Analysis

Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 are predictions about the use of high and low resource strategies. We can classify the five types of actions broadly into these high and low resource needs. We categorize economic noncooperation and protests and demonstration as strategies with high resource needs. Social noncooperation and nonviolent intervention have low resource needs. Resources needed for political noncooperation vary.

Economic noncooperation requires extensive participation to be effective because it is designed to be costly to the government in terms of economic performance. Longer duration and higher participation economic noncooperation lead to greater costs on the state. For example, the Ceylon Workers’ Congress representing Tamils in Sri Lanka have engaged in boycotts since the late 1980’s, and Akali Dal has periodically called day-long strikes to press Sikh demands in India.\(^{10}\)

Protest and demonstration also require large-scale mobilization of people, either at one time, or sequentially. In the short term, relatively small protests might gain media attention, though larger protests will be more likely to do so. In the longer term, large protests can impose costs on the state through disruption to normal functioning of government or daily life of the citizenry at large. For example, the Kurdistan National Liberation Front organized thousands to protest Turkish treatment of Kurds outside the European Commission in Brussels in 1992.\(^{11}\)

Alternatively, nonviolent intervention, and social and political noncooperation do not necessarily require large numbers of people to mobilize. Nonviolent intervention can be effective with very limited participation. In 1995, Sinn Fein members chained themselves together to

\(^{10}\) See event codesheets for details.

blockade a motorway, stopping traffic as rush hour. The amount of resources required depends on the logistical target choice. Successful implementation is contingent on the police not immediately arresting everyone and being able to cause disruption to the government or citizenry and to call direct attention to the policy issue under dispute.

Social noncooperation requires only one person, though more people may increase its impact. It requires no resources other than the attention of the media. For example, a member of the Basque ETA-M engaged in a two month hunger strike in 2004 advocating for Basque self-determination. Similarly, eight student members of the Student Solidarity for the People (SMUR) launched a hunger strike in 2003 in support of Acehnese demands on Indonesia.

Political noncooperation may require large-scale participation for electoral boycotts (or mass nonparticipation). It also requires physical resources to run a campaign supporting the boycott. For example, the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement led by John Garang in 1986 boycotted elections. Withdrawal from government requires fewer, but select, individuals to participate in order to achieve the goal of de-legitimizing or calling negative attention to the government. The Basque National Party employed this strategy when it withdrew support from the informal governing coalition in

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12 The Irish Times May 5, 1995, City Edition “Riot was sad, perhaps fleeting flashback. Violence such as was seen on Wednesday does not portray the real Derry.” [Accessed through Lexis Nexis 12/8/13]

13 AP online. 27 February 2000. “Basque member Ends Hunger Strike.” [Accesses through Factiva 10/18/13]

14 Antara. 10 March 2003. “Students Stage Hunger Strike Outside JSC Office” [Accessed through Factiva 04/02/13].

Spain in 1997. As such, political noncooperation cannot easily be categorized as predominantly high or low resource dependent.

Given this categorization, we lay out our expectations with respect to the four hypotheses. Figure 2 shows our expectations based on Hypothesis 1 on the left to right diagonal. Each strategy is expected to directly diffuse. The figure also illustrates the expected relationships based on the three diversification hypotheses (H2 – H4). We would expect that the use of economic noncooperation and protests should make the other less likely (H2). Hypothesis 3 centers on the effect of high resource strategies on the use of low resource strategies. Thus, we expect that both economic noncooperation and protests by other organizations will increase the chance of an organization using nonviolent intervention and social noncooperation. Finally, hypothesis 4 is about the link between low resource strategies, and we would predict that other organizations using nonviolent intervention and social noncooperation will increase the probability that organizations use the other low resource strategy. Table 1 summarizes these expectations.

Table 1. Expectations

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<th>Economic noncooperation</th>
<th>Protest</th>
<th>Nonviolent intervention</th>
<th>Social noncooperation</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Decrease (H2)</td>
<td>Increase (H3)</td>
<td>Increase (H3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest</td>
<td>Decrease (H2)</td>
<td>Increase (H1)</td>
<td>Increase (H3)</td>
<td>Increase (H3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent intervention</td>
<td>Increase (H1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Increase (H1)</td>
<td>Increase (H4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social noncooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Increase (H4)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Increase (H1)</td>
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</tbody>
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Before testing these hypotheses, we examine the interdependence of the use of nonviolence generally. Our initial expectation is that organizational use of nonviolence leads to nonviolence by

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other organizations because a number of other phenomena in political contention follow this pattern. Moreover, analysis at the country level shows that nonviolent campaigns diffuse spatially (Gleditsch and Rivera 2015). We delve into this trend by examining whether the use of any nonviolent strategy by other organizations increases the chance that any given organization will use nonviolence. Table 2 shows a simple bivariate test of this. The dependent variable is whether an organization used any type of nonviolence in a given year. The key independent variable of interest is the number of organizations that used nonviolence in the previous year. We use a logistic regression model with standard errors clustered on the organization and include the number of years since the organization last used nonviolence, as well as $t$-squared and $t$-cubed (following Carter and Signorino 2010 on methods to address temporal dependence).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 2. Logistic regression of organizational use of any nonviolent strategy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number organizations using nonviolence (l year lag)</td>
<td>0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$t$</td>
<td>-0.846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$t^2$</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$t^3$</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>10,888</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses, $t$ is time since an organization used nonviolence
Statistically significant indicators bolded (0.05 level)

This analysis reveals a positive relationship between organizational use of nonviolence and the use of nonviolence by other organizations. At first glance, it appears that nonviolence diffuses, but this tells us little about whether particular strategies increase the use of those strategies (direct diffusion) other types of strategies (diversification), or both.
Hypotheses 1 through 4 specifically address how different nonviolent strategy choices are likely to affect the calculus of other organizations. To assess the interdependence of organization strategy choices, we employ seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) using linear probability modeling. A seemingly unrelated regression is a way of modeling a system of relationships between independent and dependent variables that are likely linked due to correlated errors. This approach is often used in economics to model things like household consumption (where the separate dependent variables are categories such as housing, clothing, and food) where the error terms likely are correlated due to expenditures in any one area coming from a single household budget.

We have clear reason to believe choices about non-violence are linked in such a way, particularly for movements such as those seeking national self-determination that have a limited pool of resources and common aims. SUR allows us to both determine endogenous interdependence and structure the analysis in a way that reflects the theoretical argument that the error terms are correlated. Using Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression (sureg in STATA), we run six equations in which the dependent variable (DV) is alternately each nonviolent strategy and an indicator of the use of violence against the state by the organization.

In each equation, we include a lagged measure (one year) of the number of other organizations in the same self-determination movement that used each type of nonviolent strategy,

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17 In addition to assessing whether non-violence strategy choices are linked, SUR has efficiency gains in estimation where information on different equations is combined. The regression coefficient estimators are asymptotically more efficient using SUR than those obtained by the separate estimation of equations. Moreover, SUR allows us to look at a set of factors within a system of choices, rather than dichotomously.
as well as cubic polynomials for time for each dependent variable. The cubic polynomials address possible temporal dependence; that the use of a specific strategy may be more or less likely depending on how recently that organization used that strategy.

We also include controls for the use of institutionalized political activity (such as fielding candidates), and whether other organizations used violence in the previous year. In some equations we also control for the size of the ethnic group represented by the organization, and the host country’s regime type (measured as Polity2). These controls are added to models where we expect population size or regime type to play a role in influencing the viability of the strategy. Movement population is included in models where the strategy has high mobilization needs (economic noncooperation and protest). Regime type is included in models of protests and political noncooperation where we expect the degree of political openness will influence the ease with which these strategies can be used. Table 3 shows the estimated coefficients and Table 4 provides the correlation matrix.

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18In an alternative specification, we use the percentage of organizations employing specific strategies each year (see Appendix Table 7). A key difference in the findings in that model is a reciprocal positive relationship between economic noncooperation and protest (high resource strategies). This suggests perhaps a threshold effect for these strategies that are most effective with mass mobilization.

19The indicator for institutional participation takes a value of one if an organization registers as a political party or participates in an election or electoral campaign (at the local or national level).
Table 3. SUR Model Results on all NV strategies and violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1 year lag of number of orgs using</th>
<th>(1) Economic noncooperation</th>
<th>(2) Protest &amp; Demonstration</th>
<th>(3) Social noncooperation</th>
<th>(4) Nonviolent intervention</th>
<th>(5) Political noncooperation</th>
<th>(6) Violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violence against the state</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic noncooperation</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest &amp; Demonstration</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social noncooperation</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent intervention</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political noncooperation</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional action</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log group population</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity2</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>10,180</td>
<td>10,180</td>
<td>10,180</td>
<td>10,180</td>
<td>10,180</td>
<td>10,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.182</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.232</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses, cubic polynomials included but not reported
Statistically significant indicators bolded (0.05 level)
### Table 4: Correlation Matrix of residuals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Economic noncooperation</th>
<th>Protest &amp; demonstration</th>
<th>Social noncooperation</th>
<th>Nonviolent intervention</th>
<th>Political noncooperation</th>
<th>Violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic noncooperation</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest &amp; Demonstration</td>
<td>0.2181</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social noncooperation</td>
<td>0.1284</td>
<td>0.2062</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent intervention</td>
<td>0.1941</td>
<td>0.2084</td>
<td>0.1912</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political noncooperation</td>
<td>0.0797</td>
<td>0.1337</td>
<td>0.0434</td>
<td>0.0578</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence against state</td>
<td>0.1189</td>
<td>0.1495</td>
<td>0.1381</td>
<td>0.1147</td>
<td>0.0889</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Breusch-Pagan test of independence: chi(15) = 3363.075, Pr = 0.0000
The system of equations analysis indicates interdependence of organizational strategies. The correlation of residuals and the Breusch-Pagan test of independence are statistically significant. The coefficients in Table 3 indicate the predicted change in the probability of an organization’s use of a particular strategy as another additional organization uses a particular strategy in the previous year.20

The first thing to highlight from the SUR models is that there is direct diffusion among almost all strategies. That is, for every strategy except political noncooperation, an increase in the number of other organizations using the strategy makes any particular organization more likely to do so. For example, the largest impact is observed with social noncooperation, where the chance of an organization using social noncooperation increases by 200% with the addition of another organization using the strategy in the previous year. Figure 2 shows this effect of each strategy on the use of that particular strategy.

20 We use a one-year lag in order for organizations to observe the use of strategies by others.
The impact of this direct diffusion is strongest for social noncooperation and nonviolent intervention, the two low resource strategies examined here. Both economic noncooperation and protests have a positive impact on the likelihood that other organizations use the same strategy. The smallest impact is that of other organizations using violence on violence, which is primarily where diffusion has been explored in other studies.

Figure 2 provides evidence at the organization level for a diffusion of nonviolence. Yet the analysis in Table 3 demonstrates a great deal of interdependence beyond direct diffusion within a single strategy. Figure 3 shows the percent change in the baseline probability of each strategy being used by an organization as an additional other organization uses each nonviolent strategy. The top panels illustrate the impact of economic noncooperation, protest and demonstration and social noncooperation. The bottom panels show the effect of nonviolent intervention, political
noncooperation and violence. In each panel, the x-axis labels indicate the set of strategies we consider. Zero is marked by a dashed line, and no bar means that there was no statistically significant effect based on the SUR model in Table 3.
Figure 3. Diffusion through diversification across NV strategies
What do these trends say with respect to the interdependence of nonviolence strategy choices? With respect to H2, we find mixed support. Our expectation is that economic noncooperation and protest will each make the other strategy less likely to be used. As panel 1 in Figure 3 indicates, the use of economic noncooperation by other organizations decreases the chance that any particular organization will use protest. Panel 2 indicates no statistically significant effect of protest on economic noncooperation, though the coefficient is negative in Table 3. Thus, we find that the use of one of the high resource strategies reduces the use of the other, and that neither have a positive effect on one another.

Hypothesis 2 predicted that high resource strategies (economic noncooperation and protest) would increase the use of low resource strategies because organizations will be concerned about their ability to mobilize many people but want to remain active in the dispute. Several findings in Table 3 provide support for this. Panel 2 shows that protest by other organizations makes both social noncooperation and nonviolent intervention (low resource strategies) about 40% more likely. Both protest and economic noncooperation make political noncooperation (which can be a low resource strategy) about 25% more likely (panels 1 and 2). In contrast to our expectations in H3, Panel 1 shows that economic noncooperation makes social noncooperation less likely. This is unexpected because social noncooperation has low resource needs, while economic noncooperation has high resource needs.

We also find some support for H4, which predicts that low resources strategies will have a positive effect on one another. Panel 3 reveals that social noncooperation increases the use of nonviolent intervention (a low resource strategy), as well as political noncooperation (which can be low resource), by about 100% and 50%, respectively. Interestingly, social noncooperation by other organizations also increases the probability that any particular organization will use economic noncooperation and protest, which we do not have predictions about. As expected, the other low
resource strategy, nonviolent intervention, has a positive impact on social noncooperation, making the activity about 50% more likely. Thus, both expectations from H4 are supported empirically.

Taken together, we see clear evidence of diversification based on a logic of resource needs and consequent strategy diversification in addition to direct diffusion of strategies. We find some support for each hypothesis related to strategy diversification and uncover a great deal of variation in the extent to which strategy choices impact one another across the nonviolent choices. The magnitude of many of these effects are similar, leading to about a 50% increase or decrease in the chance a strategy is used. The effects of social noncooperation on other strategies (particularly economic noncooperation and nonviolent intervention) are the strongest, leading to an over 100% increase for economic noncooperation and about a 75% increase for nonviolent intervention.

While we do not have explicit expectations about political noncooperation because it can be either a low or high resource strategy, Panel 5 suggests that it does not follow our predicted pattern exactly for either low or high resource strategies. The use of political noncooperation by other organizations decreases the use of social noncooperation and nonviolent intervention. Yet, economic noncooperation, protest, and social noncooperation all make political noncooperation more likely. The nature of political noncooperation and its link to other strategies needs further exploration.

The central focus of this article is the use of nonviolent strategies, but we incorporate the primary alternatives (conventional/institutional politics and violence) in our empirical models. The models yield several findings about violence. The use of violence by a given organization in a year is negatively affected by high resource strategies (economic noncooperation and protest), as well as by political noncooperation (panels 1, 2, and 5). In contrast, social noncooperation is associated with increased use of violence. As more organizations use social noncooperation, any given organization
is more likely to employ violence. Moreover, the use of violence by other organizations decreases the chance that an organization will use protest or nonviolent intervention (panel 6).

A greater use of conventional tactics (institutionalized participation) has a positive effect on several nonviolent strategies. We distinguish institutionalized participation from nonviolent direct action because it is not a strategy of disruption and de-legitimization (see Sharp 1973). It increases the chance of protest and social noncooperation, though the size of the effect is small compared to other factors. However, it has a large effect on political noncooperation, which we would expect given that the strategy requires some degree of institutionalized participation to be used. Larger groups are more likely to use high mobilization strategies (economic noncooperation and protest). We find no effect for regime openness on protest or political noncooperation.

Robustness of findings

We ran a number of additional analyses employing the SUR models. First, many country-specific contextual factors may influence the utility of strategies. We reproduce Table 3 with country dummies in Appendix Table 1. The findings are similar to those presented here with respect to our hypotheses. We also address conflict dynamics. The models in Table 3 account for the use of violence by organizations, but do not incorporate the role of state violence. We included a decay function of armed conflict between the movement and the state (coded from UCDP with a 25 battle death per year threshold) (see Appendix Table 2). Armed conflict has a positive and statistically significant influence on economic noncooperation, and a negative and significant impact on protest. When we account for armed conflict, protest no longer has a positive impact on organizational use of violence.

Beyond civil war, states engage in both repression and accommodation of groups seeking self-determination (see Appendix Table 3). When we include measures of repression against the
group and accommodation of their demands, we find that repression increases the likelihood of all type of non-violence and of violence.\textsuperscript{21} Accommodation is associated with a decrease in the chance of violence by an organization.\textsuperscript{22}

Adding controls for political instability, the population size and geographic concentration of the group represented by the movement, and the Polity2 score to all models from Table 3 (see Appendix Table 4), we find the following. Political instability makes economic noncooperation and nonviolent intervention less likely.\textsuperscript{23} Larger groups are correlated with lower probability of nonviolent intervention (a strategy requiring few people), while the use of institutional action by other organizations make nonviolent intervention more likely. Increase in the Polity2 score is associated with a small increase in the chance of nonviolent intervention, and a decrease in the use of violence.

We also examine the effect of links between organizations in a social movement. We code whether organizations are considered to be a “wing” of another organization, which suggests a closer tie that may impact coordination of strategies (see Appendix Table 5). Whether an organization is a “wing” has a positive effect on the use of social noncooperation and violence, but all other findings are similar to the models in Table 3. Finally, we control for the number of organizations in the movement (see Appendix Table 6). More organizations make all strategies less

\textsuperscript{21} Repression is based on the Political Terror Scale and is coded positively if we find evidence of repression against the group relying on State Department Human Rights and Amnesty International reports (Gibney et al 2015).

\textsuperscript{22} Accommodation data is from Cunningham (2014) and includes only accommodation related to self-determination claims.

\textsuperscript{23} Political instability is measure as a three or greater change in three years in the Polity2 scale.
likely, and its inclusion alters the level of statistical significance of some factors, but all signs remain similar the models in Table 3.

**Conclusion**

This article advances a new perspective for thinking about interdependence in contentious politics. We argue that direct diffusion, where the use of one strategy increases the use of that strategy by other actors, is only one path through which interdependence affects strategy choices. Interdependence also leads to strategy diversification. Strategies’ varying resource needs, the varying capabilities of organizations, and their desire to participate in some way in the dispute create incentives for organizations to diversify when other organizations are active in a shared social movement. Looking at the variety of nonviolent strategies used by organizations making demands on the state, we see not only that there is great variation in what organizations do to challenge the state, but that there are multiple paths of diffusion at work.

This article focuses empirically on self-determination disputes because these disputes provide an opportunity to look at mobilized actors without limiting the sample to actors that use one specific strategy. In so doing, it also allow for a fuller analysis of the use of nonviolence by these movements. Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011) study of mass nonviolent campaign indicated that very few campaigns are organized by self-determination movements. Indeed, less than 4% of the self-determination movements in this study engage in nonviolent campaigns. Yet, when we look at the organizations seeking self-determination, and at a variety of strategies, we find a great deal of nonviolent activity in self-determination movements. Nonviolence is used in over 75% of the movements.

Emphasizing rebellion and mass nonviolent campaign has led to a mischaracterization of these disputes as inherently or overly violent. This mischaracterization can have negative
consequences, influencing how scholars and practitioners think about mediation in these cases and where we expect conflict resolution to be successful. Moreover, a mischaracterization of self-determination movements as overly violent affects understanding of the practice of nonviolence, our expectations about where it is likely to happen, and when it is likely to succeed. The prevalence of diversification of strategies in these disputes can help us to account for why mass nonviolent campaign is so uncommon in self-determination struggles. Organizations diversifying across strategy type may impede the escalatory process that characterizes mass nonviolent campaigns.

More broadly, the logic of strategy diversification developed here is not necessarily limited to movements for national self-determination. This new way of thinking about interdependence could be applied to variation in violent contention, or other situations in which actors make interdependent choices about their actions. Scholars could, for example, examine how different strategies influence each other in democratization movements or across borders in conflict prone areas. The evidence provided here demonstrates that we need to think more rigorously about interdependence, moving beyond looking simply at the diffusion of specific strategies or outcomes.
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