Introducing the Strategies of Resistance Data Project

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This article introduces the Strategies of Resistance Data Project (SRDP), a global dataset on organizational behavior in self-determination disputes. This dataset is actor-focused and spans periods of relative peace and violence in self-determination conflicts. By linking tactics to specific actors in broader campaigns for political change, we can better understand how these struggles unfold over time, and the conditions under which organizations use conventional politics, violent tactics, nonviolent tactics, or some combination of these. SRDP comprises 1,124 organizations participating in movements for greater national self-determination around the world, from 1960 to 2005. Despite the fact that few self-determination movements engage in mass nonviolent campaign, SRDP shows that 40% of organizations within these movements employ nonviolent tactics at some point in time. This is greater than the percent that employ violence (about 30%). Moreover, about 15% of organizations use both violent and nonviolent tactics in the same year. We compare the data with the most-used dataset on nonviolence, the NAVCO 2.0 Data Project, to demonstrate what we gain by employing an organization-level dataset on tactics. We present a set of descriptive analyses highlighting the utility of the SRDP, including an examination of tactic switching (i.e. changing from violence to nonviolence or mixed tactics, or the reverse). We show that more organizations change from violence to nonviolence than the reverse – challenging the widely-held assumption that organizations "resort" to violence. SRDP allows scholars to examine organizational choices about tactics, and trends in these tactics, with much greater nuance.

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The recent use and, in some cases, highly visible success of mass nonviolent campaigns has focused attention on nonviolent resistance around the world. Critical attention has been called to the use and efficacy of such resistance campaigns (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Yet, mass protests are only one of many tactics employed by opposition movements. Many smaller-scale tactics, such as sit-ins, boycotts, and instances of self-harm (such as self-immolation) are also used by dissidents seeking political change.

At times, these nonviolent tactics occur in parallel with violence. In other instances, opposition actors exclusively use nonviolent tactics to press their claims. Despite the frequent characterization of opposition actors as either violent "rebels" or "terrorists" in most large-n conflict datasets, many opposition organizations shift from one type of tactic to another over time or employ multiple tactics simultaneously. To understand why conflicts, both nonviolent and violent, unfold as they do, we need to understand why specific actors make use of different (or different combinations of) tactics.

A key challenge for scholars and policy makers is how to better understand patterns of tactical choices by organizations in contentious political contexts. Many of the most-used data sources for exploring conflict processes center on actors that are identified by their use of violence, such as the Correlates of War (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010), the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (Gleditsch et al., 2002; and Allansson et al., 2017), and the Non-state Actor Data (Cunningham et al., 2013). These datasets cannot speak to the constraints motivating organizations to use nonviolence or to choose among nonviolent tactics. To do so, we need data on organizations that vary in their use of different tactics, and are not identified by the use of violence. This will allow us to account for the ability of actors to elect alternative dissent choices beyond what has been their primary strategy.

Other data projects center on events within regional samples but do not offer a comprehensive list of relevant actors that make tactical choices, such as the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) (Salehyan et al, 2012), Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) (Raleigh et al., 2010)

and NAVCO 3.0 events data (Chenoweth et al., 2018). While these datasets offer information on actors involved in events, they do not include potentially relevant actors that do not engage in specific types of contention (such as actors that employ conventional tactics or engage in public claim-making).[1] Works by several scholars address the use of terrorist tactics at the organizational level, but do not include nonviolent alternatives (Findley and Young, 2012; Stanton, 2013; Polo and Gleditsch, 2016). The Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior project (Asal et al., 2008) addresses organizations directly and includes both violent and nonviolent tactics, but only in regional samples and with a limited number of nonviolent tactics.

Works specifically addressing nonviolence typically focus on "campaigns" or "campaign years" as the unit of analysis rather than organizations or discrete tactics. Most studies of nonviolent resistance typically focus on the overall trajectory of a campaign, but stop short of examining the specific combination of tactics used by participating organizations (Svensson and Lindgren, 2011; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013; Sutton, Butcher and Svensson, 2014). Belgioioso (2018) goes a step further, examining the use of terrorist tactics in both violent and nonviolent campaigns, but not at the organization level.

In this article, we introduce the Strategies of Resistance Data Project (SRDP), a new global dataset on organizational behavior in self-determination disputes. In contrast to most conflict processes datasets, the SRDP is actor-centric but not reliant on a specific behavior to identify actors. SRDP includes disaggregated measures of types of nonviolent tactics, as well as information on the use and targets of violence at the organizational level. Structuring the data this way makes it possible to examine how organizations choose and combine tactics to achieve their goals. By linking tactics to

[1] NAVCO 3.0 includes some information on rhetorical statements.

specific actors in broader movements for political change, we can better understand how these struggles unfold and when they will be successful.

Motivating the SRDP

While numerous studies examine the strategic use of political violence, far less attention is dedicated to the strategic use of nonviolence by social movements. The field has only scratched the surface with regards to how organizations leverage a variety of tactics (violent, nonviolent, and conventional, as well as mixes among them) and to what extent using a diversity of tactics is itself an effective strategy. Key findings on the success of nonviolence from Chenoweth and Stephan's (2011) study draw on the experiences of large nonviolent campaigns. Chenoweth and Stephan advanced the study of nonviolence by comparing the success of large scale civil war and mass nonviolent campaigns, and showing that, on average, nonviolence is more effective. Yet, many small-scale tactics (such as nonviolent interventions) are used outside the context of mass "campaigns" and are excluded from studies, even though they are common forms of dissent. SRDP directly addresses the diversity of tactical repertoires by disaggregating organizational behavior so that analysts can study the causes and effects of specific tactics, combinations of specific tactics, and changes among tactics.

SRDP's approach deviates from existing work on political resistance in three important ways. First, the literature tends to concentrate on specific types of action, such as terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981), protest (Francisco, 1996), rebellion (Gurr, 1970), or civil war (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Cederman et al., 2013). Inherent in this decision is a selection bias in which actors are observed based on their dominant tactic. This has led to the prevailing assumption that resistance methods can be characterized as a binary choice between violence and nonviolence. SRDP challenges this assumption by taking the organization as the unit of analysis regardless of their dominant tactic or whether they engage in non-conventional political behavior.

Second, the focus in the past decades on campaign-level dynamics (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Ackerman and DuVall, 2000) constrains the types of research questions that can be asked. Centered on the organization level, SRDP can explore trends in tactical choice within a broader movement or a specific organization, including the shift between tactics and how tactics are combined, or the diffusion or interdependence of tactics across organizations (Cunningham et al 2017). Moving past the traditional emphasis on violence or mass nonviolence as part of a campaign also allows us to examine incidents of small-scale resistance as well as those occurring during or outside periods of war, peace, and discrete organized campaigns.

Finally, there exist a limited number of global datasets that include information on nonviolent resistance. The Global Nonviolent Action Database[2] describes hundreds of campaigns. However, it does not lend itself to quantitative analysis because it lacks a clearly defined sampling frame and identification criteria. The Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) Data Project (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011) is a much more comprehensive resource on mass nonviolent campaign. Now in its third version, NAVCO covers aggregate data on campaigns from 1990 to 2006 (version 1.1), yearly data on campaigns from 1945 to 2006 (version 2.0), and event-level data from 21 countries on tactical choice from 1991 to 2012 (version 3.0). The original data took mass campaigns as its starting point, excluding all activity associated with lower levels of resistance that do not develop into campaigns. NAVCO 3.0 (like ACLED and SCAD) provides events data with some information on actors, but for a broader set of event types. Like ACLED and SCAD, however, NAVCO 3.0 codes at the level of contentious events, but does not identify actors distinct from these events. In sum, SRDP is unique because it captures a broad array of resistance action, both violent and nonviolent, at

[2] https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/

the organization level around the globe and includes organizations with political claims that could engage in violent or nonviolent contention but do not.

The SRDP Dataset

SRDP comprises 1,124 organizations participating in movements for greater national self-determination (SD) around the world from 1960 to 2005. We define a "movement" as collective mobilization around the same cause within a population, and "organization" as named and organized entities that mobilize for a movement on behalf of that population. SD organizations operate within SD movements and necessarily have a goal related to political or cultural autonomy. SRDP does not define organizations by their choice of tactics; it is agnostic to whether an SD organization employs any disruptive tactics, uses violence, nonviolence, or diversity of tactics to pursue their goals.

Examining organizations in SD movements offers a unique opportunity to create this type of data and provides a novel and important testing ground for theories of strategic choice. SD movements around the world include a multitude of organizations that all make similar demands for self-rule and we find a great deal of tactical variation. Examining nonviolence in the context of SD movements is also substantively important because these disputes are typically examined in the context of civil war. This is, in part, because few SD movements engage in mass nonviolent campaign compared to the number that engage in civil war. In addition, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) find secessionist movements are the one area where mass nonviolent campaign is not effective. However, as the SRDP shows, nonviolent action is common in these movements.

SD movements provide a clear set of organizational actors to study that, crucially, can be identified prior to the use of any specific tactic. This is because they all operate within larger movements that share the same goal of self-rule (i.e. organizations self-identify by the claims they make). SD disputes are typically long-term struggles and it is possible to identify organizations mobilized around the issue that are not engaged in the large-scale events that have drawn significant

attention in many existing datasets. Most of the time, SD organizations make demands on the state without using violent or nonviolent tactics.

SD movements, thus, provide an opportunity to compare organizations in similar types of disputes, where we can identify actors separate from the use of a specific tactic. Such movements differ from other social movements (such as pro-democracy movements) in several ways. SD movements have a stable and bounded population of constituents, and the benefits that accrue to these movements in terms of concessions tend to benefit all members (Cunningham 2014). Moreover, while SD movements can and do fragment into multiple organizations, these organizations remain focused on greater self-determination for the SD population. Such differences should be taken into account in generalizing findings using the SRDP.

The initial list of organizations in SD movements comes from Cunningham (2014).[3] The actors were identified though systematic search of the following: profiles in Uppsala Conflict Data Project, Minorities At Risk (MAR) group profiles, reports in Keesing's Record of World Events and LexisNexis Academic news sources (which includes sources from around the world).

Self-determination demands vary widely even within a movement. Some organizations seek to increase rights (e.g. language rights), while some favour increased autonomy or outright independence, and others want to be united or reunited with another state. Organizations may seek more control in substantive areas (e.g. education, cultural affairs, taxation) or changes in structure and organization of their host state (e.g. devolution or federalism). Organizations that make demands for democratization that do not relate to greater self-rule for the SD group (such as federalism) are not included.

An organization is considered "active" so long as it is making public demands, with the assumption of continuous activity where reports of activity are separated by up to three years. This

[3] See Cunningham (2014: 62 – 64) for methodology.

means that organizations are included in the data when there was initial evidence of claims over self-determination being made, and if these claims continue. If there is no evidence of nonviolent or violent behaviour in any given year, the organization remains in the data as active but not engaging in any specific nonconventional political acts so long as demands continue to be made within these defined parameters.

The SRDP covers 138 SD movements in 76 countries, including movements such as the Basque in Spain, the Berbers in Morocco and the Rohingya in Myanmar. Many movements are represented by multiple different organizations over time. On average, movements in the data have eight organizations across the period of study. The number of organizations active in one single year varies from 1 to 40 different organizations.

A central challenge for building an organization level dataset is assessing which organizations are unique. Historically, the field has dealt with this issue by linking violent organizations and their nonviolent (or political) wings, often assuming these are two facets of a single entity. Despite having overt links, armed wings and political wings often take ideologically opposed positions on tactics and tend to have different leadership. For example, the political and military wings of ETA in Spain identify as linked but wholly distinct organizations, as such, we identity them as unique organizations in SRDP.

A second, related, challenge in identifying organizations comes from the dynamic process of fragmentation in many national self-determination disputes. A number of SD organizations have what could be considered distinct sub-factions, which operate independently in their actions and have different leadership, such as the numerous splits in the Southern People's Liberation Army in Sudan. The SRDP treats different factions as distinct organizations with the ability to select tactics independently of one another as long as there is evidence of a split with the preceding organization, typically associated with a new leader taking power.

Building on previous work (c.f. Sharp 1973), the SRDP data includes five types of nonviolent tactics.

- *Economic noncooperation*: strikes, tax refusals or consumer boycotts.
- *Protest and demonstration*: rallies, protests, or demonstrations.
- *Nonviolent intervention*: sit-ins, occupations, or blockades.
- *Social noncooperation*: hunger strikes, self-immolation or other self-harm.
- *Political noncooperation*: organizational boycotts of elections or withdrawals from political office or coalition in the national government.

In addition to these nonviolent actions, SRDP provides new data on whether a specific organization employed violence. We distinguish between the targets of violence, including attacks on the state, another organization within the same SD movement, in-group civilians, or out-group civilians. We also indicate whether the violence resulted in a fatality on either side of the dispute.

For each organization, a dichotomous indicator is coded positively if there is evidence that an organization used that tactic in a given year. An organization must either organize the action or have its members publicly participate in the tactic in order for it to be coded positively. The tactic variables were coded from five sources including Lexis Nexis, Factiva, Keesing's Record of World Events, the MAR Database, and the UCDP Encyclopedia. MAR and UCDP are constructed by third parties and both stem from multiple types of sources (news and secondary academic). Appendix Table 2 provides a description of each tactic and the search terms employed in the coding.

SRDP draws on event-level data, but tactic variables are dichotomous. Consequently, we do not count the number of events for a given tactic in each year. While events data would provide an even richer picture of tactical choice, this dataset provides a critical starting point for researchers looking to investigate the use of distinct tactics employed by organizations. Data code-sheets provide details on each specific event used to code the variables.

Challenges for SRDP

Several challenges arise for the data project, including potential reporting bias, source reliability, information availability, assumptions regarding actors, and inter-coder reliability. The Appendix provides detailed information on coding, sources, and intercoder reliability measures. Our goal was to ensure that the data was collected in as systematic and unbiased way as possible, but it is essential to acknowledge shortcomings inherent with the approach for transparency and proper use of the data. First, the quality and volume of reporting varies across cases. High-profile events, countries, and individuals often drive news coverage. The quality of news articles varies as well: certain cases attracted numerous press reports whereas others received minimal attention. Limited coverage of events makes Type II errors more likely. We draw upon five sources that each rely on somewhat different data-generation processes to minimize the impact of such errors.

Source reliability is also a concern for any data generation process using news coverage to identify events and link them to specific actors. Sources may conceal or exaggerate the truth (whether intentionally or unintentionally), which colors how events are described. To mitigate this challenge, we complement news-based information with the MAR and UCDP accounts of these disputes. MAR and UCDP both rely on a set of secondary sources (including books and journal articles) which have lesser chance of reporting bias.[4]

Another potential source of bias in the data is limited information on certain cases. News reports varied in the depth of coverage. In some instances, news articles provide superficial accounts but not clear information about the details of the specific events. There is also temporal variation in the availability of news reports from some sources. Access to news coverage of a number of

[4] MAR and UCDP also rely on news coverage, so these sources are not wholly distinct from the other sources.

movements is substantially greater after 1990, in large part due to greater online access and archiving.[5] To address this issue, we employ multiple sources with different time frames and content.

To address concerns about inter-coder reliability, we employed multiple coders for each organization and a third person reviewed each coder's information to confirm compliance with coding rules (see Appendix). In any case of discrepancy between the data and the coding rules, a new coder was responsible for clarifying details of the event, then recoding that piece of data. All events used to code the tactics variables are documented with original source information.

Despite the challenges of collecting this type of data, SRDP makes an important contribution to a field that has focused primarily on violence or mass nonviolent campaign, and often defines actors of interest by the tactics they employ. The tactics captured in this dataset represent a set of vital yet often overlooked methods of resistance and a plethora of tactical variation that is only revealed through this type of data collection process.

Exploring Strategies of Resistance

The SRDP demonstrate a great deal of variation in the tactics employed by organizations. One surprising trend, given the empirical focus on violent separatism in the field, is that more organizations used nonviolence than violence. Forty percent (446 organizations) engaged in nonviolent activity in at least one year, while only 332 organizations engaged in violence against the state (about 30%). While most studies characterize organizations dichotomously as violent or not, we find that 172 organizations (about 15%) engaged in both violent and nonviolent actions. Among these, the vast majority (144 organizations) used violent and nonviolent tactics in the same year. Such a diversity of

[5] We code the presence or absence of specific tactics. While there is still greater media coverage, these indicators are likely to be less biased than an event-based dataset.

tactics is not possible to see in the absence of organization-level data that account for a multitude of different tactics.

Among observations where nonviolence is used, we see a single type of nonviolent action in a given year 72% of the time. In that set of cases, the most commonly used nonviolent tactic is protests, followed by economic noncooperation and political noncooperation. Figure 1 shows this variation in the use of a number of different nonviolent tactics in the 1,692 organization-year observations with nonviolent behavior.

Figure 1 here

A comparison with the most commonly used nonviolence dataset (NAVCO 2.0) shows the extent to which SRDP captures previously unseen tactical variation. We examine secessionist movements in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset, which is at the campaign-year level. Following Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), we employ the term "campaign" as a "series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective" (p. 14). The two key differences between NAVCO 2.0 and SRDP regarding observations' inclusion are (i) whether the group in question has a maximalist goal (i.e. seceding from the state) and (ii) whether mobilization turns into a large-scale campaign; mobilizing more than 1,000 people (nonviolent) or inflicting more than 1,000 battle-deaths (violent). SRDP includes all organizations making claims over national self-determination (regardless of level of mobilization) and includes organizations with non-maximalist goals such as increased autonomy.[6]

[6] Comparison to NAVCO 3.0 events data would be illustrative, but the NAVCO 3.0 includes only 12 countries that have SD movements (some partially coded).

We begin the comparison by matching SD movements that are active in NAVCO campaigns and the SRDP dataset. We identify 47 NAVCO campaigns with clear links to one or more SD organizations in the SRDP dataset. This means that the NAVCO campaign directly represented the SD movement (such as the East Timorese) or that an organization representing the SD movement participated in the NAVCO campaign.[7] Table I shows how many organization-years we observe using nonviolent, violent, or mixed tactics based on SRDP across the NAVCO campaign types, as well as those organizations in SRDP that are not included in a NAVCO campaign. Table I does not include SRDP organization years where no nonconventional activity is identified.

Table I here

NAVCO includes 14 campaigns that overlap with active SD movements in the SRDP data during predominantly nonviolent years. Among the nonviolent NAVCO campaigns represented in the SRDP data, we identify 149 organization-years where an organization employs nonviolent, violent, or mixed tactics. The majority are observations of nonviolence, but 30% include violence against the state, and 28% are mixed.

Table I further demonstrates that although violent tactics are more frequently used during violent NAVCO campaign years, it is also quite common to see nonviolent tactics employed in the context of predominantly violent campaigns. During predominantly violent campaign years, we see the use of nonviolent tactics alone in 31% of the organization years, and in combination with violent tactics in 21% of the organization years. Focusing solely on the predominant strategy excludes a large

[7] See Appendix Table 9. SD organizations sometimes participated in a joint struggle, such as the anti-Taliban campaign in Afghanistan.

amount of nonviolent activity taking place during violent campaign years, making it more difficult to grasp the causes and consequences of both nonviolent and violent action, especially regarding how organizations choose which tactics to use and when to change tactics.

The most striking observation from Table I is that the bulk of both nonviolent and violent activity in SD disputes takes place outside the large-scale NAVCO campaigns. Nearly 70% of the nonviolent organization-years and 54% of the violent organization-years take place outside the context of a NAVCO campaign. The large amount of activity SRDP identified outside NAVCO campaigns implies that most SD organizations employing nonviolent or violent resistance methods do not meet NAVCO's maximalist or mass campaign definition.

SRDP allows us to build on and extend beyond our understanding of mass nonviolent campaign. It also allows us to address critical questions such as: Why do organizations choose to mix tactics? Under what conditions do movements fully shift from one type of tactic to another? Of the NAVCO campaigns that include both periods of predominantly nonviolent and violent strategies, six alternate, two shift to nonviolence, and four shift to violence. This does not suggest a clear trend in tactical shifting, but the high barriers to inclusion as a campaign may limit our ability to see a dynamic process of tactical competition and shifting at earlier stages. SRDP allows for a more fine-grained look at tactical choice and change.

Tactical Change

The SRDP allows us to examine trends in tactics across a set of behaviors. We see a plethora of tactics employed, and frequent change. Examining yearly variation in the tactics used by organizations, we see a change in tactics in 18% of observations (more than 2000 organization-years). To explore this variation, we examine the following types of change from each tactic:

- Exclusive use of violence TO (1) exclusive use of nonviolence, (2) mix of violence and nonviolence, or (3) no action.
- Exclusive use of nonviolence TO (1) exclusive use of violence, (2) mix of violence and nonviolence, or (3) no action.
- Mixed TO (1) exclusive use of nonviolence, (2) exclusive use of violence, or (3) no action.
- No action TO (1) exclusive use of nonviolence, (2) exclusive use of violence, or (3) a mix.

Figure 2 shows the number of observations where we see switching tactics from one year to the next grouped by the starting point. The top three bars show changes from nonviolence, the middle three from violence, the next three from a mix of tactics, and the final three from no activity.

Figure 2 here

Tactics change in a number of ways. It is not the case that organizations progress linearly from nonviolence to violence, i.e. they are not "resorting to violence" as many assume. A switch from violence to nonviolence is actually more common than the reverse. The extent to which we observe these year-to-year changes suggests that organizations are not necessarily committed to, or have the capacity to, sustain the use of just one tactic. This tactical flexibility is downplayed or entirely missed in more aggregated data or data collected based on the type of resistance.

Correlates of Tactic Change

We provide a first look at potential correlates of different changes in tactics at both the organization and movement levels of analysis using a series of multinomial logistic models to examine all possible switches from each tactic. For example, the first model examines the switch from nonviolence to violence, mixed tactics, or no activity. The second model examines the switch from

violence to nonviolence, mixed tactics, or no activity. These analyses include factors often shown to be empirically associated with the use of violence and nonviolence (though it is not exhaustive).[8] These are the fragmentation of the movement (logged), the size of the movement's constituent population, whether a specific organization made a demand for independence, whether the movement's population was concentrated territorially, if there was an active civil war, whether the country was a democracy, the size of the country population, and the level of economic development (GDP per capita logged).

Tables 3 and 4 show the impact of different factors on these changes at the organization and movement level. As expected, we see different factors playing a role in changes in tactics across these models. For example, a higher degree of fragmentation is associated with organizations switching from violence to nonviolence (Table II model 4), but does not have the same impact of a change from nonviolence to violence (Table II model 1). Moreover, in the movement-level analysis, we see that having at least one organization that demands independence decreases the chance that the movement stops using nonviolence (Table III model 3) but increases the chance that the movement will cease violence (Table III model 6).

Table III here

Table IV here

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[8] See Appendix Table 8 for models with previous use of tactics.

A comparison across levels of analyses shows consistent effects in some instances (such as the negative impact of independence seeking on a change from nonviolence to no activity) but different effects in others (such as the impact of an active civil war on the change from violence to nonviolence). The Appendix includes comparisons of the marginal effects at the organization and movement level for all types of tactic change.

Conclusion

With SRDP, scholars can pursue new research questions, empirically test established assumptions, or bolster the case for existing theories. This is particularly relevant for studies that seek to understand organizational decision making, and what factors are likely to impact the use of different strategies of contention. Moreover, SRDP can shed light on how nonviolent tactics diffuse within or across organizations, movements, and countries. These questions have been difficult to address with existing data because datasets have tended to focus only on specific types of actors (such as rebel groups), mass mobilization, regional samples, or have failed to account for the specific actors in the case of many events datasets. SRDP provides an opportunity to build on existing quantitative analyses, and to examine the generalizability of key findings from qualitative studies.

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

Figure 1. Variation in Nonviolent Tactics Employed in a Year

Table I: SRDP Organizational Activity by NAVCO Campaign

	During Nonviolent Campaign	During Violent Campaign	No NAVCO Campaign	Total number of observations
SRDP orgs using nonviolent tactics	63 (42%)	334 (31%)	864 (53%)	1261
SRDP orgs using violent tactics	44 (30%)	530 (49%)	620 (38%)	1194
SRDP orgs using mixed tactics	42 (28%)	228 (21%)	161 (10%)	431
	149 (100%)	1,092(100%)	1,645 (100%)	2886



Figure 2. Changes in Tactics Organization-level

Table III. Multinomial Logistic Analysis of Tactic Switching (Organization Level)

	From Nonviolence to			From Violence to			From Mix to			From None to		
	violence	mix	none	NV	Mix	none	violence	NV	none	NV	mix	none
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Fragmentation	0.405	0.241	0.243*	0.762**	0.131	-0.035	0.382	0.075	0.329	0.257*	-0.207	0.154
	(0.273)	(0.250)	(0.098)	(0.249)	(0.217)	(0.118)	(0.280)	(0.219)	(0.237)	(0.101)	(0.106)	(0.232)
Group population	-0.125	0.233	0.225**	-0.251	0.030	-0.027	0.295	0.146	-0.079	0.246**	-0.069	-0.009
	(0.169)	(0.141)	(0.064)	(0.157)	(0.166)	(0.060)	(0.177)	(0.137)	(0.125)	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.112)
Independence claim	0.036	-0.372	-0.528**	0.287	-0.076	0.394*	-0.425	-0.308	-0.491	-0.544**	0.447*	-0.588
	(0.590)	(0.452)	(0.148)	(0.554)	(0.437)	(0.184)	(0.534)	(0.399)	(0.383)	(0.154)	(0.188)	(0.369)
Concentration	12.700**	1.731	0.264	13.345**	1.454	0.309	0.951	1.641	14.725**	0.294	0.265	1.000
	(0.412)	(0.970)	(0.240)	(0.292)	(1.057)	(0.382)	(0.951)	(1.022)	(0.287)	(0.249)	(0.336)	(0.714)
Active civil war	1.069*	0.273	-0.139	0.511	2.180**	0.418**	-0.030	1.921**	0.041	-0.131	0.986**	0.530
	(0.440)	(0.332)	(0.159)	(0.463)	(0.482)	(0.157)	(0.395)	(0.366)	(0.330)	(0.164)	(0.152)	(0.306)
Democracy	-0.240	-0.397	0.124	-0.646	0.073	-0.396*	0.078	-0.406	-0.118	-0.014	-0.124	-0.399
	(0.535)	(0.372)	(0.197)	(0.607)	(0.329)	(0.172)	(0.397)	(0.322)	(0.324)	(0.211)	(0.173)	(0.406)
Country population	-0.072	0.022	0.035	0.041	0.100	-0.090	-0.046	0.158	0.060	0.017	-0.050	0.141
	(0.139)	(0.131)	(0.048)	(0.167)	(0.105)	(0.057)	(0.136)	(0.103)	(0.106)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.117)
GDP (log)	0.289	0.588**	0.332**	0.110	0.403**	-0.017	0.373	0.572**	-0.027	0.370**	-0.037	0.144
	(0.158)	(0.185)	(0.072)	(0.221)	(0.133)	(0.074)	(0.191)	(0.136)	(0.118)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.135)
Constant	-20.479**	-13.622**	-8.283**	-19.831**	-12.206**	-2.619**	-11.238**	-14.555**	-20.073**	-8.497**	-2.654**	-8.473**
	(1.543)	(2.352)	(0.950)	(2.898)	(2.101)	(0.935)	(2.578)	(1.942)	(1.431)	(1.041)	(0.890)	(1.781)
Observations	9,799	9,799	9,799	9,799	9,799	9,799	9,799	9,799	9,799	9,799	9,799	9,799

Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table IV. Multinomial Logistic Analysis of Tactic Switching (Movement Level)

	From Nonviolence to			From Violence to			From Mix to			From None to		
	violence	mix	none	NV	Mix	none	violence	NV	none	NV	mix	none
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Fragmentation	0.537	0.952**	0.577**	0.602	1.071**	-0.046	0.985**	0.930**	0.343	0.747**	0.013	0.169
	(0.483)	(0.230)	(0.159)	(0.337)	(0.255)	(0.173)	(0.319)	(0.265)	(0.273)	(0.153)	(0.158)	(0.269)
Group population	-0.227	0.068	0.239*	0.042	0.053	-0.112	0.087	0.147	0.116	0.182	-0.105	0.078
	(0.277)	(0.173)	(0.112)	(0.276)	(0.160)	(0.087)	(0.234)	(0.159)	(0.163)	(0.112)	(0.077)	(0.131)
Independence claim	0.426	0.077	-0.932**	1.708	-0.160	0.768**	0.068	-0.528	0.094	-0.934**	0.677**	-0.029
	(0.736)	(0.519)	(0.253)	(1.264)	(0.338)	(0.245)	(0.522)	(0.321)	(0.369)	(0.266)	(0.234)	(0.408)
Concentration	12.746**	0.133	-0.520	14.678**	1.704	0.219	0.450	14.661**	15.209**	-0.396	0.351	1.125
	(0.561)	(0.642)	(0.312)	(0.594)	(1.116)	(0.563)	(0.941)	(0.468)	(0.400)	(0.313)	(0.490)	(0.931)
Active civil war	-0.894	-1.743*	-2.125**	-16.020**	1.473**	-0.550	-2.782*	1.337**	-1.593*	-2.285**	0.072	-0.655
	(1.085)	(0.682)	(0.597)	(0.556)	(0.341)	(0.326)	(1.103)	(0.384)	(0.790)	(0.608)	(0.218)	(0.610)
Democracy	-1.266	-0.865	0.508	-1.118	-1.151**	-0.423	-0.444	-1.186**	-0.166	0.160	-0.122	-0.499
	(0.984)	(0.487)	(0.303)	(0.979)	(0.395)	(0.280)	(0.518)	(0.426)	(0.424)	(0.317)	(0.246)	(0.415)
Country population	0.090	0.053	-0.084	-0.016	0.139	-0.086	0.010	0.122	0.114	-0.067	-0.080	0.298*
	(0.148)	(0.195)	(0.097)	(0.235)	(0.120)	(0.100)	(0.184)	(0.143)	(0.131)	(0.091)	(0.076)	(0.138)
GDP (log)	0.668*	0.184	0.073	0.372	0.242	-0.064	0.020	0.263	-0.197	0.172	-0.163	-0.083
	(0.336)	(0.172)	(0.114)	(0.317)	(0.144)	(0.099)	(0.184)	(0.146)	(0.149)	(0.123)	(0.093)	(0.139)
Constant	-23.299**	-7.449**	-4.699**	-24.727**	-10.539**	-1.314	-6.419*	-23.927**	-20.547**	-5.203**	-0.864	-8.591**
	(3.998)	(2.689)	(1.485)	(3.677)	(1.958)	(1.361)	(2.585)	(1.846)	(1.926)	(1.576)	(1.271)	(2.205)
Observations	3,158	3,158	3,158	3,158	3,158	3,158	3,158	3,158	3,158	3,158	3,158	3,158

Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Strategies of Resistance Project Data Appendix

A. Summary Statistics

Table 1. Organization-level Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Exclusive use of nonviolence	12,017	0.10	0.31	0	1
Exclusive use of violence	12,017	0.10	0.30	0	1
Mix of nonviolence and violence	12,017	0.04	0.19	0	1
Change from NV [1=violence, 2=mix, 3=none]	12,017	0.14	0.61	0	3
Change from violence [1=nonviolence, 2=mix, 3=none]	12,017	0.10	0.53	0	3
Change from mix [1=nonviolence, 2=violence, 3=none]	12,017	0.03	0.27	0	3
Change from none [1=nonviolence, 2=violence, 3=mix]	12,017	0.12	0.44	0	3
Fragmentation	11,987	1.54	0.82	0	3.66
Group population	9,928	7.37	1.36	3.92	10.23
Independence claim	11,987	0.61	0.49	0	1
Concentration	10,363	0.92	0.28	0	1
Active civil war	12,016	0.29	0.46	0	1
Democracy	11,867	0.62	0.49	0	1
Country population	12,016	10.73	1.75	5.25	14.07
GDP (log)	12,016	8.01	1.33	4.42	10.58

Table. 2. Movement-level Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Exclusive use of nonviolence	5,549	0.07	0.26	0	1
Exclusive use of violence	5,549	0.13	0.33	0	1
Mix of nonviolence and violence	5,549	0.08	0.27	0	1
Change from NV [1=violence, 2=mix, 3=none]	5,549	0.09	0.48	0	3
Change from violence [1=nonviolence, 2=mix, 3=none]	5,549	0.11	0.53	0	3
Change from mix [1=nonviolence, 2=violence, 3=none]	5,549	0.05	0.31	0	3
Change from none [1=nonviolence, 2=violence, 3=mix]	5,549	0.10	0.44	0	3
Fragmentation	3,903	0.87	0.76	0	3.66
Group population	4,426	7.07	1.36	3.79	10.22
Independence claim	3,903	0.49	0.50	0	1
Concentration	4,539	0.87	0.34	0	1
Active civil war	5,549	0.14	0.34	0	1
Democracy	5,487	0.42	0.49	0	1
Country population	5,549	10.36	1.69	5.25	14.07
GDP (log)	5,549	7.39	1.42	3.87	10.58

B. Binary coding of each tactic use

The research assistants used the following sources to code each tactic for each organization on a yearly basis. Each source and the process followed is described here. RAs used data from these sources for any available years based on the source.

- **Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)**. The UCDP Encyclopedia of conflicts provides a profile for each rebel actor in the conflict, as well as a description of the dyad in conflict (state vs. rebels). This information includes a summary as well as yearly information for all years that the conflict reached a 25 battle-death threshold. This source was employed primarily to code the violence indicators. UCDP indicates the following with respect to their primary sources: "The data presented by UCDP is based on information taken from a selection of publicly available sources, printed as well as electronic. The sources include news agencies, journals, research reports, and documents of international and multinational organizations and NGOs."

- **Minorities at Risk Profile (MAR)**. The MAR program provides a general summary of each SD movement, as well as a detailed timeline. MAR uses a variety of sources for these profiles including news reports, academic journal articles, and books. An example of source information for the

Hazaras in Afghanistan is provided in the footnote.[9] The time span covered by the MAR timelines varies by case.

- **Searchable News Reports and Archives**: Research assistants searched each set of terms for each year with the inclusion of the organization's name and aliases. For example, Corsican National Liberation Front-Union of Combatants was active from 2002 – 2005 in the Corsican group in France. The RA coding economic cooperation entered this name (and its aliases and acronyms) as well as strike, boycott, tax refusal. This returned a set of reports. When the RA found evidence of the organization's participation in economic noncooperation, they moved on to the next year. The number of reports per organization-year varied widely depending on the geographic region ("hot spots" in the Middle East received more media attention, for example, than lesser known conflicts in South America), by the tactics employed by the organization (violence tended to receive more media coverage), and by the year of activity (there was more media coverage after 1980). RAs read through approximately 10 reports per year for each term in each of searchable databases before moving on to another source (excluding duplicate reports within a specific search program). For example, an RA would read 30 reports from searchable archives for the Corsican organization and the term "boycott" in a single year before coding a zero on boycott for that organization-year. Table A below indicates the search terms used in both the Lexis Nexis and Factiva program, as well as instructional notes to the RAs. A sample of sources for 12 cases is included in Table B below. Two movement cases were randomly selected in each region.
    - **Lexis Nexis Academic** (Nexis Uni). This service includes more than 40,000 news sources dating back to 1970. RAs searched only in English language reports.
    - **Keesing's Record of World Events**. Keesing's in an independent archive that provides news summaries from 1960 onward. Keesing's employs its own writers and editors and publishes weekly reports on politics.
    - **Factiva**. This service provides access to "full-text access to over 8,000 business sources including national and international newspapers, magazines, wire services, web sites and industry (trade) sources. It covers "business news articles in a wide range of topic areas: companies, industries, markets, products, brands, and general financial articles."[10] The dates covered vary by source, but begin in 1979. All sources used were in English (originally or translated).

Table 3. Coding Search Terms Provided to Research Assistants

	Description	Search Terms
Economic noncooperation	Reports of strikes, tax refusal or consumer boycotts that are either organized by the	Strike, boycott, tax refusal

[9] [1] Ahady, Anwar-ul-Haq. 1991. "Afghanistan, State Breakdown." in Jack Goldstone, Ted R. Gurr and Frank Moshiri, eds. Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century, Boulder: Westview, 162-93. [1] Ahady, Anwar-ul-Haq. 1991. "Conflict In Post-Soviet-Occupation Afghanistan." Journal of Contemporary Asia. 21:4. 513-28. [3] Ahady, Anwar-ul-Haq. 1994. "The Changing Interests of the Regional Powers and the Resolution of the Afghan Conflict." Asian Affairs: An American Review.21:2. 80-93. [4] Jawad, Nassim. 1992. Afghanistan: A Nation of Minorities. Minority Rights Group. [5] Nerwell, Richard S. 1989. "Post-Soviet Afghanistan: The Position of Minorities." Asian Survey. 29:11. 1090-1108. [6] Lexis/Nexis. Various news reports. 1990-2006. [7] Nyrop, Richard F. and Donald M. Seekins, eds. 1986. [8] Afghanistan: A Country Study, The American University. Roy, Olivier. 1990. Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [9] Sarabi, Humayun. 2006. "Politics and Modern History of Hazara: Sectarian Politics in Afghanistan." The Fletcher School, Tufts University.

[10] Description quote from University of Maryland Database.

	organization, or people from the organization have participated. * For all variables, do not code events that have not yet occurred.	
Protest and demonstration	Rally, protest, or demonstration either organized by the organization, or people from the organization have participated. *These need to be events, not just the use of the word protest.	Rally, march, protest, demonstration
Non-violent intervention	Sit-ins, occupations, or blockades reported; either organized by the organization, or people from the organization have participated.	Sit-in, blockade, occupation
Social noncooperation	Hunger strike, self-immolation or other self-harm reported; either organized by the organization, or people from the organization have participated.	Hunger strike, self-immolation, self-harm
Institutional action	Organization registers as political party, participates in an election, participates in an electoral campaign. Both national and local elections included. *Running in transnational elections (i.e., European Union) does not count. *Running in elections in occupied territory counts (i.e., Palestinian legislative elections). * Party registration can be described as "formed" or "announced" instead of "registered", depending on the reporter. You can count these instances as institutional action. * Passing a bill or supporting/opposing legislation does not count.	Registers, political party, election, candidate
Political noncooperation	Organization boycotts an election or withdrawals from political office or coalition *in the government*. *Does not include cases where org. leave/join non-state coalitions or groups. *Does not include walk-outs or boycotts of parliament (without a withdrawal) *Boycott of office must be from central office (unless it is a local government with sufficient autonomy – e.g. Northern Irish Assembly).	Boycott, withdrawal

Violence against the state	Any violence was against government or people working for government (military and police forces included). *The organization must be attacking or at least fighting back. Attacks by the state alone do not count. *Civilians armed by the state or paramilitaries supported by the state are counted as the state. *Police and militias in occupied territories (i.e., Palestine) are counted as organizations, not the state. *Officials running for office are coded as civilians.	Fight, attack, bomb, target
Fatal violence against the state	Violence was against government or people working for government (military and police forces included) wherein at least one person died (regardless of who that person is). *The organization must be attacking or at least fighting back. Attacks by the state alone do not count. *Attacks on former members of an organization are attacks on civilians.	Fight, attack, death, deadly, kill
Violence against another organization	Any violence against another organization operating within the same group in the dataset. Specify the organization. *Fighting within an organization does not count.	Fight, attack, bomb, target, kidnap *report must indicate a target organization
Fatal violence against another organization	Violence against another organization operating within the group wherein at least one person died (regardless of who that person is). Specify the organization. *Fighting within an organization does not count	*same as above, but report must indicate a target organization. Fight, attack, death, deadly, kill
Violence against in-group civilians	Any violence against civilians of the group's population. The "group" is identified in the code sheet. * Report must state clearly who civilian targets were so that you can identify them as in-group civilians. Unspecified civilians cannot be coded as in-group. *Note: If reporting is extremely biased (consistently does not report ethnicity of civilian victims), allowances for ingroup coding are made. Check with PI.	*same as above, but report must indicate a target population. Fight, attack, bomb, target

	* If the "group" resides in Country A and Country B, when coding orgs. in Country A, all individuals and organizations in Country B are outgroup civilians, even if they are part of the same "group". Ex: Iraqi Kurds are outgroup for Turkish Kurds, and vice versa. *Do not code instances where civilians are "collateral damage". Indiscriminate violence, such as landmines is codeable. *Attacks on former members of an org. are attacks on civilians.	
Fatal violence against in-group civilians	Violence against civilians in the group's population wherein at least one person died (regardless of who that person is). * Report must state clearly who civilian targets were so that you can identify them as in-group civilians. Unspecified civilians cannot be coded as in-group. *the "group" is identified in the code sheet.	*same as above, but report must indicate a target population. Fight, attack, death, deadly, kill
Violence against out-group civilians	Any violence against civilians outside of the group's population. * Report must state clearly who civilian targets were so that you can identify them as out-group civilians. Unspecified civilians cannot be coded as out-group. If something is unclear, ask Lead graduate RAs. * If the "group" resides in Country A and Country B, when coding orgs. in Country A, all individuals and organizations in Country B are outgroup civilians, even if they are part of the same "group". Ex: Iraqi Kurds are outgroup for Turkish Kurds, and vice versa. *Do not code instances where civilians are "collateral damage". Indiscriminate violence, such as landmines is okay. *Attacks on former members of an org. are attacks on civilians. *Does not include attacks on foreign militaries (do not code these cases).	*same as above, but report must indicate a target population that is not the group population. Fight, attack, bomb, target

Fatal violence against out-group civilians	Violence against civilians outside of the group's population wherein at least one person died (regardless of who the person is). * Report must state clearly who civilian targets were so that you can identify them as out-group civilians. Unspecified civilians cannot be coded as out-group. If something is unclear, ask Lead graduate RAs.	*same as above, but report must indicate a target population that is not the group population. Fight, attack, death, deadly, kill

Table 4. Sample Sources Across Regions

Region	Case	Sources
Africa	Afars in Ethiopia	BBC; Xinhua General News Service; The Indian Ocean Newsletter; UCDP
Africa	Anjouanese in Comoros	Agence France Presse; Keesing's Record of World Events; BBC; Reuters News
Latin America	Indigenous Peoples in Chile	Keesing's Record of World Events; EFE News Services; IPS-Inter Press Service
Latin America	Indigenous Peoples in Nicaragua	New York Times; BBC; Associated Press; IPS-Inter Press Service; United Press International; Globe and Mail; Xinhua General News Service; Washington Times
North Africa/Middle East	Kurds in Iraq	Boston Globe; National Public Radio; Atlanta Journal-Constitution; Times London; Reuters News; St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri); New York Times: Agence France Presse; BBC; Keesing's Record of World Events; UCDP; The Globe and Mail (Canada); United Press International; The Guardian (London); Middle East Economic Digest; Press Association; The Independent (London); Xinhua General News Service; Saint Paul Pioneer Press (Minnesota); Turkish Daily News; Kurdistani Nuw (daily newspapers in Soran; Kurdish published by Patriotic Union of Kurdistan); Dow Jones International News; RIA Novosti; MAR; Washington Post Foreign Service; Deutsche Presse-Agentur; Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily; Guardian Weekly
Middle East/North Africa	Berbers in Algeria	Reuters News; BBC; Agence France Presse; Associated Press; ANSA English Media Service; The Guardian (London); United Press International; Mideast Mirror; World Markets Analysis; Africa News
Western Europe/North America	Quebecois in Canada	MAR; The Toronto Star; The Ottawa Citizen; The Record (Kitchener- Waterloo, Ontario; The Gazette (Montreal, Quebec); Keesing's Record of World Events; Calgary Herald (Albert Canada); Globe and mail; The Vancouver Sun (British Colombia); Reuters News; Associated Press; New York Times; Canadian Press; Edmonton Journal; United Press International
Western Europe/North America	Walloons in Belgium	Keesing's Record of World Events; Associated Press; The Wall Street Journal; Agence France Presse; The Spectator; The Irish Times; Reuter's News; West European Politics
Eastern Europe	Gaguaz in Moldova	United Press International; BBC
Eastern Europe	Hungarians in Slovakia	BBC; MAR; Associated Press; CTK National News Wire; Agence France Presse; TASR- Tlacova Agentura Slovenskej Republiky; Czech News Agency

Asia	Acehnese in Indonesia	The Advertiser; Japan Economic Newswire; Agence France Presse; The Indonesian National News Agency; Jakarta Post; UCDP; Associated Press; BBC; Deutsche Presse-Agentur; Keesing's Record of World Events; Xinhua general news service; Newsworld; Asia Pulse Pte Limited
Asia	Malay Muslims in Thailand	BBC; Japan Economic Newswire; Bangkok Post; Agence France Presse; Xinhua General News Service; The Nation (Thailand); Associated Press; The Straits Times; Keesing's Record of World Events; Reuters News; United Press International; Deutsche Presse-Agentur; The Washington Times

RAs coded a tactic positively (and included source information) if they found a credible report in the sources listed above. If the report did not provide sufficient information to clarify participation by the organization, RAs continued to search for further reports and did not code the tactic positively. An additional review of each worksheet verified that all identified events met the criteria for inclusion in the dataset and were properly documented. An additional check of the recorded source was made for any questionable positive coding during the reviewing process.

C. Inter Coder Reliability

The data collection involved a number of research assistants (both undergraduate and graduate). All research assistants began with a training set, wherein every RA coded the same case (the Chittagong Hill organizations in Bangladesh). This included 98 organization-year observations across seven Chittagong organization. We compared the number of events positives across the research assistants. Table C reports the kappa statistic for each pair of research assistants.[11] We report a weighted kappa because this is a comparison of count of positive codings (rather than binary indicators). A kappa statistic less than or equal to zero indicates no agreement, with increasing values indicating more agreement. A kappa of 0.41 – 0.60 is considered "fair" by the metric's developer Cohen (1960), and McHugh (2012) suggest that 80% is an acceptable inter-coder agreement rate. The training data yields an average rate of agreement in the pairwise comparison of 81.95% and a mean kappa of 0.50.

Table 5. Cohen's Kappa

Coder pairing		Percent agreement	Expected agreement	kappa	std. err.	Z	prob>z
r2	r1	79.52%	64.69%	0.42	0.1595	2.63	0.0042
r3	r1	84.21%	63.96%	0.5618	0.1539	3.65	0.0001
r3	r2	85.71%	64.60%	0.5964	0.1645	3.63	0.0001
r4	r1	77.73%	64.11%	0.3796	0.1329	2.86	0.0021
r4	r2	78.06%	63.99%	0.3907	0.1506	2.59	0.0047
r4	r3	85.29%	65.31%	0.5761	0.1582	3.64	0.0001

[11] Cohen's Kappa is one of a number of ways to assess inter-coder reliability (see Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and Braken 2002).

r5	r1	71.83%	61.11%	0.2755	0.1113	2.48	0.0066
r5	r2	76.37%	61.15%	0.3919	0.1528	2.56	0.0052
r5	r3	86.19%	62.79%	0.6289	0.1624	3.87	0.0001
r5	r4	80.10%	64.43%	0.4406	0.1617	2.72	0.0032
r6	r1	83.04%	64.54%	0.5216	0.1432	3.64	0.0001
r6	r2	80.48%	62.45%	0.4801	0.1611	2.98	0.0014
r6	r3	87.39%	63.03%	0.6591	0.1762	3.74	0.0001
r6	r4	84.69%	67.35%	0.5312	0.154	3.45	0.0003
r6	r5	79.12%	62.95%	0.4364	0.1587	2.75	0.003
r7	r1	91.35%	66.70%	0.7403	0.1613	4.59	0
r7	r2	79.46%	64.67%	0.4188	0.1647	2.54	0.0055
r7	r3	87.62%	64.15%	0.6546	0.1642	3.99	0
r7	r4	84.03%	65.01%	0.5437	0.144	3.77	0.0001
r7	r5	77.04%	63.48%	0.3713	0.1374	2.7	0.0034
r7	r6	81.70%	63.78%	0.4947	0.1575	3.14	0.0008
Mean		81.95%	64.01%	0.50063333			

Table 6 reports agreement by variable for a randomly selected set of cases with two coders. This includes 102 organization-year observations in eight movements. The two sets of codings are compared for each observation and the percent agreement is the number of observations where the coding matched (both coded zero or both coded as one). The percent agreement across variables ranges from 80.38% to 100% suggesting a high degree of inter-coder reliability.

Table 6. Inter-coder Agreement

Variable	% agreement
Economic noncooperation	99.02%
Protests and demonstrations	80.39%
Nonviolent intervention	99.02%
Social noncooperation	98.04%
Institutional action	91.18%
Political noncooperation	97.06%
Violence against the state	94.12%
Fatal violence against the state	96.08%
Violence against another organization	99.02%
Fatal violence against another organization	99.02%
Violence against in-group civilians	99.02%
Fatal violence against in-group civilians	100.00%
Violence against out-group civilians	97.06%
Fatal violence against out-group civilians	98.04%

D. Potential bias from news sources

Generating data from news reports poses a challenge with respect to bias. In particular, recent studies have shown bias in news-based data on violence related to cell phone coverage (Weidmann 2016) and ruralness (Dafoe and Lyall 2015). Yet, Mueller and Raoh (2018) show that news events can be used to predict violence, suggesting that bias introduced by the news-based data collection may not necessarily be problematic in all situations.

It is not immediately clear if the same challenges are true for data on nonviolence. As disruptive events, such data can be compared to violence. However, differences in media attention to fatalities and specific types of violence (such as terrorism) may not carry over to data on nonviolent tactics.

Based on existing work on bias in data collection (including Snyder and Kelly 1977, Gallop and Weschel 2017, and Weidmann 2016), we identify a key factor that might contribute to non-random bias in the data – country level media openness. This factor can impede or facilitate reports on contentious political behavior and is also likely to be correlated with openness more generally in the country. For our analysis of tactic switching, we address this by provide a set of models controlling for media openness from freedom house (see appendix table 7). "The Freedom of the Press report assesses the degree of media freedom in 199 countries and territories, analyzing the events and developments of each calendar year." This provides a coding of Free, Partly Free, or Not Free from 1980 – 2005.[12] Figure 1 shows the distribution of observations in the data across levels of media freedom.



Figure 1. Levels of Media Freedom

[12] Freedom House data excludes 1984.

We also recommend analysts employ the method advanced by Gallop and Weschel (2017) to assess the extent to which a particular finding is sensitive to possible bias. Following this approach, analysts could create new versions of the independent variable (or dependent variable) produced by different distributions of media freedom.[13] Using these simulated versions of the variable that account for different levels of bias, analysts can see how consistent their results are.

[13] For example, the Gallop and Weschel technique allows us to recreate measures of nonviolent tactics if we assume "free" countries are twice as likely to yield reports of specific events, to 3 times as likely, etc.

Table 7. Multinomial Logistic Analysis of Tactic Switching (Organization Level) with Control for Media Freedom

	From Nonviolence to			From Violence to			From Mix to			From None to		
	violence	mix	none	NV	Mix	none	violence	NV	none	NV	mix	none
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Fragmentation	0.347	0.114	0.152	0.853**	0.083	-0.076	0.303	0.037	0.155	0.179	-0.245*	0.186
	(0.405)	(0.260)	(0.104)	(0.327)	(0.210)	(0.127)	(0.309)	(0.214)	(0.269)	(0.107)	(0.117)	(0.281)
Group population	-0.158	0.214	0.216**	-0.266	0.022	-0.088	0.309	0.139	-0.086	0.246**	-0.111	-0.028
	(0.202)	(0.139)	(0.066)	(0.199)	(0.163)	(0.065)	(0.190)	(0.140)	(0.136)	(0.071)	(0.073)	(0.132)
Independence claim	0.076	-0.461	-0.497**	0.380	0.118	0.531*	-0.627	-0.190	-0.380	-0.426**	0.554*	-0.700
	(0.741)	(0.464)	(0.152)	(0.701)	(0.468)	(0.217)	(0.566)	(0.424)	(0.449)	(0.162)	(0.222)	(0.441)
Concentration	13.493**	1.832	0.362	13.080**	1.349	0.096	1.688	1.507	14.168**	0.391	0.010	1.478
	(0.486)	(0.981)	(0.247)	(0.368)	(1.042)	(0.405)	(1.012)	(1.010)	(0.313)	(0.244)	(0.403)	(1.061)
Active civil war	1.088*	0.277	-0.107	0.316	2.116**	0.276	-0.060	1.905**	0.063	-0.163	0.846**	0.651
	(0.495)	(0.334)	(0.158)	(0.475)	(0.412)	(0.160)	(0.408)	(0.397)	(0.353)	(0.162)	(0.172)	(0.345)
Democracy	-0.946	-0.629	0.189	-1.206	0.672	-0.077	-0.208	0.096	0.781	0.325	-0.013	-0.556
	(0.581)	(0.727)	(0.262)	(0.764)	(0.353)	(0.231)	(0.596)	(0.395)	(0.526)	(0.256)	(0.249)	(0.673)
Country population	0.030	-0.008	0.028	0.028	0.051	-0.083	-0.141	0.098	0.053	-0.002	-0.035	0.114
	(0.149)	(0.135)	(0.050)	(0.177)	(0.117)	(0.067)	(0.147)	(0.112)	(0.135)	(0.055)	(0.065)	(0.128)
GDP (log)	-0.009	0.351	0.342**	-0.260	0.371*	-0.174	0.093	0.505**	-0.188	0.394**	-0.207	-0.039
	(0.217)	(0.196)	(0.081)	(0.304)	(0.151)	(0.109)	(0.224)	(0.177)	(0.171)	(0.085)	(0.112)	(0.222)
Media Freedom	1.079*	0.517	-0.061	0.755*	-0.475*	-0.035	0.637	-0.310	-0.397	-0.298*	0.058	0.294
	(0.432)	(0.440)	(0.132)	(0.356)	(0.231)	(0.134)	(0.327)	(0.248)	(0.301)	(0.124)	(0.148)	(0.372)
Constant	-19.521**	-10.811**	-8.131**	-16.270**	-11.554**	-0.874	-8.326**	-13.430**	-18.340**	-8.630**	-0.909	-7.032*
	(2.399)	(2.550)	(0.998)	(3.824)	(2.173)	(1.317)	(3.082)	(2.289)	(1.990)	(1.079)	(1.369)	(2.855)
Observations	7,917	7,917	7,917	7,917	7,917	7,917	7,917	7,917	7,917	7,917	7,917	7,917

Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

E. Comparison of Marginal Effects: All Models in Article Tables III and IV



Figure 2. Marginal Effects on Change from Nonviolence to Violence



Figure 3. Marginal Effects on Change from Nonviolence to Mixed



Figure 4. Marginal Effects on Change from Nonviolence to None



Figure 5. Marginal Effects on Change from Violence to Nonviolence



Figure 6. Marginal Effects on Change from Violence to Mixed



Figure 7. Marginal Effects on Change from Violence to None



Figure 8. Marginal Effects on Change from Mixed to Nonviolence



Figure 9. Marginal Effects on Change from Mixed to Violence



Figure 10. Marginal Effects on Change from Mixed to None



Figure 11. Marginal Effects on Change from None to Nonviolence



Figure 12. Marginal Effects on Change from None to violence



Figure 13. Marginal Effects on Change from None to Mixed

Table 8. Multinomial Logistic Analysis of Tactic Switching (Organization Level) with Previous Tactic Use

	From Nonviolence to			From Violence to			From None to		
	violence	mix	none	NV	Mix	none	NV	mix	none
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Fragmentation	0.382	0.057	0.243*	0.778**	0.015	-0.018	0.169	-0.144	0.102
	(0.269)	(0.218)	(0.097)	(0.251)	(0.178)	(0.117)	(0.092)	(0.093)	(0.223)
Group population	-0.141	0.205	0.221**	-0.234	-0.051	-0.019	0.196**	-0.061	-0.049
	(0.181)	(0.132)	(0.062)	(0.159)	(0.138)	(0.061)	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.109)
Independence claim	0.050	-0.083	-0.524**	0.271	0.104	0.382*	-0.463**	0.369*	-0.513
	(0.580)	(0.378)	(0.148)	(0.542)	(0.405)	(0.181)	(0.128)	(0.162)	(0.358)
Concentration	12.659**	1.479*	0.322	14.167**	1.273	0.298	0.346	0.263	0.851
	(0.411)	(0.601)	(0.242)	(0.344)	(1.040)	(0.378)	(0.205)	(0.325)	(0.660)
Active civil war	0.556	-0.292	0.033	0.464	1.866**	0.371*	0.017	0.744**	0.360
	(0.496)	(0.332)	(0.166)	(0.469)	(0.503)	(0.158)	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.325)
Democracy	-0.169	-0.487	0.074	-0.702	0.048	-0.423*	-0.014	-0.038	-0.414
	(0.576)	(0.418)	(0.187)	(0.620)	(0.310)	(0.172)	(0.167)	(0.167)	(0.409)
Country population	-0.050	0.047	0.034	0.060	0.117	-0.084	0.005	-0.035	0.137
	(0.144)	(0.111)	(0.046)	(0.161)	(0.096)	(0.055)	(0.040)	(0.049)	(0.108)
GDP (log)	0.221	0.469*	0.340**	0.133	0.220	0.001	0.273**	-0.024	0.048
	(0.164)	(0.188)	(0.071)	(0.237)	(0.138)	(0.075)	(0.056)	(0.068)	(0.144)
Prev. violence	1.767**	0.539	-1.077**				-1.094**	1.007**	0.132
	(0.620)	(0.507)	(0.237)				(0.233)	(0.137)	(0.383)
Prev. mixed	-0.167	2.134**	0.835**	1.779*	2.034**	1.217**	-0.019	0.220	0.907
	(0.596)	(0.491)	(0.306)	(0.827)	(0.421)	(0.342)	(0.309)	(0.390)	(0.542)
Prev. nonviolence				-1.396	-0.208	-0.872**	1.334**	-0.972**	0.293
				(0.723)	(0.417)	(0.285)	(0.123)	(0.308)	(0.392)
Constant	-20.694**	-13.066**	-8.236**	-21.028**	-10.334**	-2.793**	-7.536**	-3.175**	-7.456**
	(1.748)	(2.430)	(0.935)	(3.215)	(2.127)	(0.952)	(0.785)	(0.872)	(1.857)
Observations	9,799	9,799	9,799	9,799	9,799	9,799	9,799	9,799	9,799

Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 9. NAVCO Campaigns Linked to SD Organizations

NAVCO id	Campaign	Location	Primary method
218	Taliban/ Anti-Government Forces	Afghanistan	violent campaign
198	Shanti Bahini	Bangladesh	violent campaign
196	Serb militias	Bosnia-Herzegovina	violent campaign
48	Burma pro-democracy movement	Burma	nonviolent campaign
113	Kachin rebels	Burma	violent campaign
114	Karens	Burma	violent campaign
2	Afar insurgency	Djibouti	violent campaign
84	Freitilin	East Timor	nonviolent campaign
84	Freitilin	East Timor	violent campaign
230	Timorese resistance	East Timor	nonviolent campaign
230	Timorese resistance	East Timor	violent campaign
76	Eritrean-led rebels	Ethiopia	violent campaign
207	Somali rebels (Ogaden)	Ethiopia	violent campaign
88	Gamsakhurdia & Abkhazia	Georgia	nonviolent campaign
88	Gamsakhurdia & Abkhazia	Georgia	violent campaign
115	Kashmiri Muslim separatists	India	violent campaign
135	Mizo Revolt	India	violent campaign
144	Naga Rebellion	India	nonviolent campaign
144	Naga Rebellion	India	violent campaign
201	Sikh insurgency	India	violent campaign
87	GAM	Indonesia	violent campaign
111	KDPI	Iran	violent campaign
110	KDP Kurds	Iraq	violent campaign
251	Kurdish rebellion	Iraq	violent campaign
121	Kurdish Secession against Sadam	Iraq	violent campaign
220	Tauregs	Mali	violent campaign
69	Dniestr	Moldova	violent campaign

42	Biafrans	Nigeria	violent campaign
158	Ogoni movement	Nigeria	nonviolent campaign
97	IRA	Northern Ireland	nonviolent campaign
97	IRA	Northern Ireland	violent campaign
36	Baluchi rebels	Pakistan	violent campaign
40	Bengalis	Pakistan	violent campaign
164	Palestinian Liberation	Palestinian Territories	nonviolent campaign
164	Palestinian Liberation	Palestinian Territories	violent campaign
45	Bougainville Revolt	Papua New Guinea	nonviolent campaign
45	Bougainville Revolt	Papua New Guinea	violent campaign
139	Moro National Liberation Front	Philippines	nonviolent campaign
139	Moro National Liberation Front	Philippines	violent campaign
55	Chechen separatists	Russia	nonviolent campaign
55	Chechen separatists	Russia	violent campaign
205	Slovenian Independence	Slovenia	nonviolent campaign
73	ETA	Spain	violent campaign
125	LTTE	Sri Lanka	nonviolent campaign
125	LTTE	Sri Lanka	violent campaign
31	Anya Nya	Sudan	violent campaign
187	SPLA-Garang faction	Sudan	violent campaign
227	Tibetan Uprising	Tibet	nonviolent campaign
122	Kurdish rebellion	Turkey	violent campaign
46	Buganda Tribe	Uganda	violent campaign
243	Western Sahara Freedom Movement (POLISARIO)	Western Sahara	nonviolent campaign
243	Western Sahara Freedom Movement (POLISARIO)	Western Sahara	violent campaign
60	Croatian nationalists	Yugoslavia	nonviolent campaign
61	Croats	Yugoslavia	violent campaign

119	Kosovo Albanian	Yugoslavia	nonviolent campaign
119	Kosovo Albanian	Yugoslavia	violent campaign
120	Kosovo Albanian nationalist movement	Yugoslavia	nonviolent campaign
116	Katanga-led leftists	Zaire/DRC	violent campaign
161	PF-ZAPU guerillas	Zimbabwe	violent campaign

Table 10. External Data Sources

Variable name	**Description and source**
Fragmentation	The number of organizations active in the movement in that year (logged). This is based on Cunningham (2014)
Group population	The size of the movement's constituent population. This is based on Cunningham (2014)
Independence claim	Dummy variable indication of whether the group claimed independence or not. This is based on Cunningham (2014).
Concentration	Whether the group is geographically concentrated. This is based on the Minorities at Risk (MAR) database.
Active civil war	Dummy variable indication whether the country was undergoing a civil war that year. This is based on the Uppsala Armed Conflict Database
Democracy	This is based on Polity 2, and score 6 and above is coded as a democracy
Country population	The size of the country's population. This is based on Gleditsch (2002)
GDP (log)	The country's GDP (logged). This is based on Gleditsch (2002)

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