

Introducing the Strategies of Resistance data project

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Abstract

This article introduces the Strategies of Resistance Data Project (SRDP), a global dataset on organizational behavior in self-determination disputes. This dataset is actor-focused and spans periods of relative peace and violence in self-determination conflicts. By linking tactics to specific actors in broader campaigns for political change, we can better understand how these struggles unfold over time, and the conditions under which organizations use conventional politics, violent tactics, nonviolent tactics, or some combination of these. SRDP comprises 1,124 organizations participating in movements for greater national self-determination around the world, from 1960 to 2005. Despite the fact that few self-determination movements engage in mass nonviolent campaign, SRDP shows that more organizations employ nonviolent tactics at some point in time (about 40%) than employ violence (about 30%). Many organizations switch among tactics or use both at the same time. This data will allow analysts to examine the use of different combinations of tactics and patterns of change. We compare the data with the most-used dataset on nonviolence, the NAVCO 2.0 Data Project, to demonstrate what we gain by employing an organization-level dataset on tactics. We present a set of descriptive analyses highlighting the utility of the SRDP, including an examination of tactic switching. We show that more organizations change from violence to nonviolence than the reverse – challenging the widely-held assumption that organizations “resort” to violence. SRDP allows scholars to examine organizational choices about tactics, and trends in these tactics, with much greater nuance.

Keywords: nonviolence, civil resistance, organizational behavior

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The recent use and, in some cases, highly visible success of mass nonviolent campaigns has focused attention on nonviolent resistance around the world. Critical attention has been called to the use and efficacy of such resistance campaigns (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Yet, mass protests are only one of many tactics employed by opposition movements. Many smaller-scale tactics, such as sit-ins, boycotts, and instances of self-harm (such as self-immolation) are also used by dissidents seeking political change.

At times, these nonviolent tactics occur in parallel with violence. In other instances, opposition actors exclusively use nonviolent tactics to press their claims. Despite the frequent characterization of opposition actors as either “rebels” or “terrorists” in most large-n conflict datasets, many opposition organizations shift from one type of tactic to another over time or employ multiple tactics simultaneously. To understand why conflicts, both nonviolent and violent, unfold as they do, we need to understand why specific actors make use of different (or different combinations of) tactics.

A key challenge for scholars and policy makers is how to better understand patterns of tactical choices in contentious political contexts. Many data sources for exploring conflict processes center on actors that are identified by their use of violence, such as the Correlates of War (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010) and the Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002). These datasets cannot speak to constraints motivating organizations to use nonviolence. To do so, we need data on organizations that vary in their use of different tactics, and are not identified by the use of violence. This will allow us to account for the ability of actors to elect alternative dissent choices beyond what has been their primary strategy.

Other data projects center on events within regional samples but do not offer a comprehensive list of relevant actors that make tactical choices, such as the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) (Salehyan et al, 2012), Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) (Raleigh et al., 2010) and NAVCO 3.0 events data (Chenoweth et al., 2018). While these datasets offer information on

actors, they do not include potentially relevant actors that do not engage in specific types of contention (such as actors that employ conventional tactics). Other works address terrorism at the organizational level, but do not include nonviolent alternatives (Findley & Young, 2012; Polo & Gleditsch, 2016). The Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior project (Asal et al., 2008) addresses organizations (including nonviolent tactics), but only in regional samples.

Works specifically addressing nonviolence typically focus on “campaigns” or “campaign years” as the unit of analysis rather than organizations or discrete tactics. Most studies of nonviolent resistance focus on the overall trajectory of a campaign, but stop short of examining the specific combination of tactics used by participating organizations (Svensson & Lindgren, 2011; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013; Sutton et al., 2014). Belgioioso (forthcoming) goes a step further, examining the use of terrorist tactics in both violent and nonviolent campaigns, but not at the organization level.

We introduce the Strategies of Resistance Data Project (SRDP), a new global dataset on organizational behavior in self-determination disputes. In contrast to most conflict processes datasets, the SRDP is actor-centric but not reliant on a specific behavior to identify actors. SRDP includes disaggregated measures of types of nonviolent tactics, as well as information on the use and targets of violence at the organizational level. Structuring the data this way makes it possible to examine how organizations choose and combine tactics to achieve their goals. By linking tactics to specific actors in broader movements for political change, we can better understand how these struggles unfold and when they will be successful.

Motivating the SRDP

While numerous studies examine the strategic use of political violence, far less attention is dedicated to the strategic use of nonviolence. The field has only scratched the surface with regards

to how organizations leverage a variety of tactics (violent, nonviolent, and conventional, as well as mixes among them) and to what extent using a diversity of tactics is itself an effective strategy. Key findings on the success of nonviolence from Chenoweth & Stephan (2011) draw on the experiences of large nonviolent campaigns. They advanced the study of nonviolence by comparing the success of large scale civil war and mass nonviolent campaigns, and showing that, on average, nonviolence is more effective. Yet, many small-scale tactics (such as nonviolent interventions) are used outside the context of mass “campaigns” and are excluded from studies, even though they are common forms of dissent. SRDP directly addresses the diversity of tactical repertoires by disaggregating organizational behavior so that analysts can study the causes and effects of specific tactics, combinations of specific tactics, and changes among tactics.

SRDP’s approach deviates from existing work on political resistance in three important ways. First, the literature tends to concentrate on specific types of action, such as terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981), protest (Francisco, 1996), rebellion (Gurr, 1970), or civil war (c.f. Cederman et al., 2013). Inherent in this decision is a selection bias in which actors are observed based on their dominant tactic. This has led to the prevailing assumption that resistance methods can be characterized as a binary choice between violence and nonviolence. SRDP challenges this assumption by taking the organization as the unit of analysis regardless of their dominant tactic or whether they engage in non-conventional political behavior.

Second, the focus in the recent past on campaign-level dynamics (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) constrains the types of research questions asked. Centered on the organization level, SRDP can explore trends in tactical choice within a broader movement or a specific organization, including the shift between tactics and how tactics are combined, or the diffusion or interdependence of tactics across organizations (Cunningham et al., 2017). Moving past the traditional emphasis on violence or mass nonviolence as part of a campaign also allows us to examine incidents of small-scale resistance

and those occurring during or outside periods of war, peace, and discrete organized campaigns.

Finally, there exist a limited number of global datasets that include information on nonviolent resistance. The Global Nonviolent Action Database¹ describes hundreds of campaigns but lacks a clearly defined sampling frame and identification criteria. The Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) Data Project (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) is a more comprehensive resource on mass nonviolent campaign. Now in its third version, NAVCO covers aggregate data on campaigns from 1990 to 2006 (version 1.1), yearly data on campaigns from 1945 to 2006 (version 2.0), and event-level data from 21 countries on tactical choice from 1991 to 2012 (version 3.0). The original data took mass campaigns as its starting point, excluding activity associated with lower levels of resistance that do not develop into campaigns. NAVCO 3.0 provides events data with some information on actors for a broader set of event types. Like ACLED and SCAD, NAVCO 3.0 codes at the level of contentious events, but does not identify actors distinct from these events. SRDP is unique because it captures a broad array of resistance action, both violent and nonviolent, at the organization level around the globe and includes organizations with political claims that could engage in violent or nonviolent contention but do not.

¹ <https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/>

The SRDP dataset

SRDP comprises 1,124 organizations participating in movements for greater national self-determination (SD) around the world from 1960 to 2005. We define a “movement” as collective mobilization around the same cause within a population, and “organization” as named and organized entities that mobilize for a movement on behalf of that population. SD organizations operate within SD movements and necessarily have a goal related to political or cultural autonomy. SRDP does not define organizations by their choice of tactics; it is agnostic to whether an SD organization employs any disruptive tactics, uses violence, nonviolence, or diversity of tactics to pursue their goals.

Examining organizations in SD movements offers a unique opportunity to create this type of data and provides a novel and important testing ground for theories of strategic choice. SD movements around the world include a multitude of organizations that all make similar demands for self-rule and we find a great deal of tactical variation. Examining nonviolence in the context of SD movements is also substantively important because these disputes are typically examined in the context of civil war. This is, in part, because few SD movements engage in mass nonviolent campaign compared to the number that engage in civil war. In addition, Chenoweth & Stephan (2011) find secessionist movements are the one area where mass nonviolent campaign is not effective. However, as the SRDP shows, nonviolent action is common in these movements.

SD movements provide a clear set of organizational actors to study that, crucially, can be identified prior to the use of any specific tactic. This is because they all operate within larger movements that share the same goal of self-rule (i.e. organizations self-identify by the claims they make). SD disputes are typically long-term struggles and it is possible to identify organizations mobilized around the issue that are not engaged in the large-scale events that have drawn significant

attention in many existing datasets. Most of the time, SD organizations make demands on the state without using violent or nonviolent tactics.

SD movements, thus, provide an opportunity to compare organizations in similar types of disputes, where we can identify actors separate from the use of a specific tactic. Such movements differ from other social movements (such as pro-democracy movements) in several ways. SD movements have a stable and bounded populations of constituents, and the benefits that accrue to these movements in terms of concessions tend to benefit all members (Cunningham, 2014). Moreover, while SD movements can and do fragment into multiple organizations, these organizations remain focused on greater self-determination for the SD population. Such differences should be taken into account in generalizing findings using the SRDP.

The initial list of organizations in SD movements comes from Cunningham (2014).² The actors were identified through systematic search of profiles in the Uppsala Conflict Data Project, Minorities At Risk (MAR) group profiles, reports in Keesing's Record of World Events and LexisNexis Academic news sources (which includes sources from around the world).

Self-determination demands vary widely even within a movement. Some organizations seek to increase rights (e.g. language rights), while some favour increased autonomy or outright independence, and others want to be united or reunited with another state. Organizations may seek more control in substantive areas (e.g. education, cultural affairs, taxation) or changes in structure and organization of their host state (e.g. devolution or federalism). Organizations that make demands for democratization that do not relate to greater self-rule for the SD group (such as federalism) are not included.

An organization is considered "active" so long as it is making public demands, with the assumption of continuous activity where reports of activity are separated by up to three years. This

² Cunningham (2014: 62 – 64).

means that organizations are included in the data when there was initial evidence of claims over self-determination being made, and if these claims continue. If there is no evidence of nonviolent or violent behavior in any given year, the organization remains in the data as active but not engaging in any specific nonconventional political acts so long as demands continue to be made within these defined parameters.

The SRDP covers 138 SD movements in 76 countries, including movements such as the Basque in Spain, the Berbers in Morocco and the Rohingya in Myanmar. Many movements are represented by multiple different organizations over time. On average, movements in the data have eight organizations across the period of study. The number of organizations active in one single year varies from 1 to 40 different organizations.

A central challenge for building an organization level dataset is assessing which organizations are unique. Historically, the field has dealt with this issue by linking violent organizations and their nonviolent (or political) wings, often assuming these are two facets of a single entity. Despite having overt links, armed wings and political wings often take ideologically opposed positions on tactics and tend to have different leadership. For example, the political and military wings of ETA in Spain identify as linked but wholly distinct organizations, as such, we identify them as unique organizations in SRDP.

A second, related, challenge in identifying organizations comes from the dynamic process of fragmentation in many national self-determination disputes. A number of SD organizations have what could be considered distinct sub-factions, which operate independently in their actions and have different leadership, such as the numerous splits in the Southern People's Liberation Army in Sudan. The SRDP treats different factions as distinct organizations with the ability to select tactics independently of one another as long as there is evidence of a split with the preceding organization, typically associated with a new leader taking power.

Building on previous work (c.f. Sharp, 1973), the SRDP data includes five types of nonviolent tactics.

- *Economic noncooperation*: strikes, tax refusals or consumer boycotts.
- *Protest and demonstration*: rallies, protests, or demonstrations.
- *Nonviolent intervention*: sit-ins, occupations, or blockades.
- *Social noncooperation*: hunger strikes, self-immolation or other self-harm.
- *Political noncooperation*: organizational boycotts of elections or withdrawals from political office or coalition in the national government.

In addition to these nonviolent actions, SRDP provides new data on whether organizations employed violence. We distinguish between the targets of violence, including attacks on the state, another organization within the same movement, in-group civilians, or out-group civilians. We indicate whether the violence resulted in a fatality on either side of the dispute.

For each organization, a dichotomous indicator is coded positively if there is evidence that an organization used that tactic in a given year. An organization must either organize the action or have its members publicly participate in the tactic in order for it to be coded positively. The tactic variables were coded from five sources including Lexis Nexis, Factiva, Keesing's Record of World Events, the MAR Database, and the UCDP Encyclopedia. MAR and UCDP are constructed by third parties and both stem from multiple types of sources (news and secondary academic). Online appendix Table 2 provides a description of each tactic and the search terms employed in the coding.

SRDP draws on event-level data, but tactic variables are dichotomous. We do not count the number of events for a given tactic in each year. While events data would provide a richer picture of tactical choice, this dataset provides a critical starting point for researchers looking to investigate the use of distinct tactics employed by organizations. Data code-sheets provide details on each specific event used to code the variables.

Challenges for SRDP

Several challenges arise for the SRDP, including potential reporting bias, source reliability, information availability, assumptions regarding actors, and inter-coder reliability. The Online appendix provides detailed information on coding, sources, and intercoder reliability measures. Our goal was to ensure that the data was collected in as systematic and unbiased way as possible, but it is essential to acknowledge shortcomings inherent with the approach for transparency and proper use of the data. First, the quality and volume of reporting varies across cases. High-profile events and individuals often drive news coverage. The quality of news articles varies as well: certain cases attracted numerous press reports whereas others received minimal attention. Limited coverage of events makes Type II errors more likely. We draw upon five sources that each rely on somewhat different data-generation processes to minimize the impact of such errors.

Source reliability is also a concern for any data generation process using news coverage to identify events and link them to actors. Sources may conceal or exaggerate the truth (intentionally or unintentionally), which colors how events are described. To mitigate this, we complement news-based information with the MAR and UCDP accounts. MAR and UCDP both rely on a set of secondary sources (including books and journal articles) which have lesser chance of reporting bias.³

Another potential source of bias in the data is limited information on certain cases. News reports varied in the depth of coverage. In some instances, news articles provide superficial accounts but not clear information about the details of the events. There is also temporal variation in the availability of news reports from some sources. Access to news coverage of a number of

³ MAR and UCDP rely on news coverage, so are not wholly distinct from the other sources.

movements is greater after 1990, in large part due to greater online access and archiving. To address this issue, we employ multiple sources with different time frames and content.

To address concerns about inter-coder reliability, we employed multiple coders for each organization and a third person reviewed each coder's information to confirm compliance with coding rules (see Online appendix). In any case of discrepancy between the data and the coding rules, a new coder was responsible for clarifying details of the event, then recoding that piece of data. All events used to code the tactics variables are documented with original source information.

Despite the challenges of collecting this type of data, SRDP makes an important contribution to a field that has focused primarily on violence or mass nonviolent campaign, and often defines actors of interest by the tactics they employ. The tactics captured in this dataset represent a set of vital yet often overlooked methods of resistance and a plethora of tactical variation that is only revealed through this type of data collection process.

Exploring strategies of resistance

The SRDP demonstrate a great deal of variation in the tactics employed by organizations. One surprising trend, given the empirical focus on violent separatism in the field, is that more organizations used nonviolence than violence. Forty percent (446 organizations) engaged in nonviolent activity in at least one year, while 332 organizations engaged in violence against the state (about 30%). We also find that 172 organizations (about 15%) engaged in both violent and nonviolent actions. Among these, the vast majority (144 organizations) used violent and nonviolent tactics in the same year. Such a diversity of tactics is not possible to see in the absence of organization-level data that account for a multitude of different tactics.

Among observations where nonviolence is used, we see a single type of nonviolent action in a given year 72% of the time. In that set of cases, the most commonly used nonviolent tactic is protests, followed by economic noncooperation and political noncooperation. Figure 1 shows this

variation in the use of a number of different nonviolent tactics in the 1,692 organization-year observations with nonviolent behavior.

Figure 1 here

A comparison with the most commonly used nonviolence dataset (NAVCO 2.0) shows the extent to which SRDP captures previously unseen tactical variation. We examine secessionist movements in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset, which is at the campaign-year level. Following Chenoweth & Stephan (2011), we employ the term “campaign” as a “series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective” (p. 14). The two key differences between NAVCO 2.0 and SRDP regarding observations’ inclusion are (i) whether the group in question has a maximalist goal (i.e. seceding from the state) and (ii) whether mobilization turns into a large-scale campaign; mobilizing more than 1,000 people (nonviolent) or inflicting more than 1,000 battle-deaths (violent). SRDP includes all organizations making claims over national self-determination (regardless of level of mobilization) and includes organizations with non-maximalist goals such as increased autonomy.⁴

⁴ Comparison to NAVCO 3.0 would be illustrative, but NAVCO 3.0 includes only 12 countries with SD movements.

We begin the comparison by matching SD movements that are active in NAVCO campaigns and the SRDP dataset. We identify 47 NAVCO campaigns with clear links to one or more SD organizations in the SRDP dataset. This means that the NAVCO campaign directly represented the SD movement or that an organization representing the SD movement participated in the NAVCO campaign.⁵ Table I shows how many organization-years we observe using nonviolent, violent, or mixed tactics based on SRDP across the NAVCO campaign types, as well as those organizations in SRDP that are not included in a NAVCO campaign.

Table I here

NAVCO includes 14 campaigns that overlap with active SD movements in the SRDP data during predominantly nonviolent years. Among the nonviolent NAVCO campaigns represented in the SRDP data, we identify 149 organization-years where an organization employs nonviolent, violent, or mixed tactics. The majority are observations of nonviolence, but 30% include violence against the state, and 28% are mixed.

Table I demonstrates that although violent tactics are more frequently used during violent NAVCO campaign years, it is also quite common to see nonviolent tactics employed in the context of “violent” campaigns. During violent campaign years, we see the use of nonviolent tactics alone in 31% of the organization years, and in combination with violent tactics in 21% of the organization years. Focusing solely on the predominant strategy excludes a large amount of nonviolent activity taking place during violent campaign years, making it difficult to grasp the causes and consequences of both nonviolent and violent action, especially regarding how organizations choose which tactics to use and when to change tactics.

⁵ Online appendix Table 9.

The most striking observation from Table I is that the bulk of both nonviolent and violent activity in SD disputes takes place outside NAVCO campaigns. Nearly 70% of the nonviolent organization-years and 54% of the violent organization-years take place outside the context of a NAVCO campaign. This suggests that most SD organizations employing nonviolent or violent resistance methods do not meet NAVCO's maximalist or mass campaign definition.

SRDP allows us to build on and extend beyond our understanding of mass nonviolent campaign. It also allows us to address critical questions such as: Why do organizations choose to mix tactics? Under what conditions do movements fully shift from one type of tactic to another? Of the NAVCO campaigns that include both periods of predominantly nonviolent and violent strategies, six alternate, two shift to nonviolence, and four shift to violence. This does not suggest a clear trend in tactical shifting, but the high barriers to inclusion as a campaign may limit our ability to see a dynamic process of tactical competition and shifting at earlier stages. SRDP allows for a more fine-grained look at tactical choice and change.

Tactical change

The SRDP allows us to examine trends in tactics across a set of behaviors. We see a plethora of tactics employed, and frequent change. Examining yearly variation in the organizational tactics, we see a change in tactics in 18% of observations (more than 2000 organization-years). To explore this variation, we examine the following types of change from each tactic:

- Exclusive use of violence TO (1) exclusive use of nonviolence, (2) mix of violence and nonviolence, or (3) no action.
- Exclusive use of nonviolence TO (1) exclusive use of violence, (2) mix of violence and nonviolence, or (3) no action.
- Mixed TO (1) exclusive use of nonviolence, (2) exclusive use of violence, or (3) no action.
- No action TO (1) exclusive use of nonviolence, (2) exclusive use of violence, or (3) a mix.

Figure 2 shows the number of observations where we see switching tactics from one year to the next grouped by the starting point. The top three bars show changes from nonviolence, the middle three from violence, the next three from a mix of tactics, and the final three from no activity.

Figure 2 here

Tactics change in a number of ways. It is not the case that organizations progress linearly from nonviolence to violence, i.e. they are not “resorting to violence” as many assume. A switch from violence to nonviolence is actually more common than the reverse. The extent to which we observe these year-to-year changes suggests that organizations are not necessarily committed to, or have the capacity for, sustained use of just one tactic. This tactical flexibility is downplayed or entirely missed in more aggregated data or data collected based on the type of resistance.

Correlates of tactic change

We provide a first look at potential correlates of different changes in tactics at both the organization and movement levels of analysis using a series of multinomial logistic models to examine all possible switches from each tactic. For example, the first model examines the switch from nonviolence to violence, mixed tactics, or no activity. The second model examines the switch from

violence to nonviolence, mixed tactics, or no activity. These analyses include factors often shown to be associated with the use of violence and nonviolence (though it is not exhaustive). These are the fragmentation of the movement (logged), the size of the movement's population, whether a specific organization made a demand for independence, whether the movement's population was concentrated territorially, if there was an active civil war, whether the country was a democracy, the size of the country's population, and the level of economic development.

Tables II and III show the impact of different factors on these changes at the organization and movement level. We see different factors playing a role in changes in tactics across these models. For example, a higher degree of fragmentation is associated with organizations switching from violence to nonviolence (Table II model 4), but does not have the same impact of a change from nonviolence to violence (Table II model 1). In the movement-level analysis, we see that having at least one independence demanding organization decreases the chance that the movement stops using nonviolence (Table III model 3) but increases the chance that the movement will cease violence (Table III model 6).

Table II here

Table III here

A comparison across levels of analyses shows consistent effects in some instances (such as the negative impact of independence seeking on a change from nonviolence to no activity) but different effects in others (such as the impact of an active civil war on the change from violence to nonviolence). The Online appendix includes comparisons of the marginal effects at the organization and movement level

for all types of tactic change.

Conclusion

With SRDP, scholars can pursue new research questions, empirically test established assumptions, or bolster the case for existing theories. This is particularly relevant for studies that seek to understand organizational decision making, and what factors are likely to impact the use of different strategies of contention. Moreover, SRDP can shed light on how nonviolent tactics diffuse within or across organizations, movements, and countries. These questions have been difficult to address with existing data because datasets have tended to focus only on specific types of actors (such as rebel groups), mass mobilization, regional samples, or have failed to account for the specific actors in the case of many events datasets. SRDP provides an opportunity to build on existing quantitative analyses, and to examine the generalizability of key findings from qualitative studies.

Replication data: The dataset, codebook, and do-files for the empirical analysis in this article can be found at <http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets>

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


Figure 1. Variation in nonviolent tactics employed in a year

Table I. SRDP organizational activity by NAVCO campaign

	During nonviolent campaign	During violent campaign	No NAVCO campaign	Total number of observations
SRDP orgs using nonviolent tactics	63 (42%)	334 (31%)	864 (53%)	1,261
SRDP orgs using violent tactics	44 (30%)	530 (49%)	620 (38%)	1,194
SRDP orgs using mixed tactics	42 (28%)	228 (21%)	161 (10%)	431
	149 (100%)	1,092(100%)	1,645 (100%)	2,886




Figure 2. Changes in tactics organization-level

Table II. Multinomial logistic analysis of tactic switching (Organization level)

	<u>From nonviolence to</u>			<u>From violence to</u>			<u>From mix to</u>			<u>From none to</u>		
	violence	mix	none	NV	Mix	none	violence	NV	none	NV	mix	none
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Fragmentation	0.405 (0.273)	0.241 (0.250)	0.243* (0.098)	0.762** (0.249)	0.131 (0.217)	-0.035 (0.118)	0.382 (0.280)	0.075 (0.219)	0.329 (0.237)	0.257* (0.101)	-0.207 (0.106)	0.154 (0.232)
Group population	-0.125 (0.169)	0.233 (0.141)	0.225** (0.064)	-0.251 (0.157)	0.030 (0.166)	-0.027 (0.060)	0.295 (0.177)	0.146 (0.137)	-0.079 (0.125)	0.246** (0.068)	-0.069 (0.065)	-0.009 (0.112)
Independence claim	0.036 (0.590)	-0.372 (0.452)	-0.528** (0.148)	0.287 (0.554)	-0.076 (0.437)	0.394* (0.184)	-0.425 (0.534)	-0.308 (0.399)	-0.491 (0.383)	-0.544** (0.154)	0.447* (0.188)	-0.588 (0.369)
Concentration	12.700** (0.412)	1.731 (0.970)	0.264 (0.240)	13.345** (0.292)	1.454 (1.057)	0.309 (0.382)	0.951 (0.951)	1.641 (1.022)	14.725** (0.287)	0.294 (0.249)	0.265 (0.336)	1.000 (0.714)
Active civil war	1.069* (0.440)	0.273 (0.332)	-0.139 (0.159)	0.511 (0.463)	2.180** (0.482)	0.418** (0.157)	-0.030 (0.395)	1.921** (0.366)	0.041 (0.330)	-0.131 (0.164)	0.986** (0.152)	0.530 (0.306)
Democracy	-0.240 (0.535)	-0.397 (0.372)	0.124 (0.197)	-0.646 (0.607)	0.073 (0.329)	-0.396* (0.172)	0.078 (0.397)	-0.406 (0.322)	-0.118 (0.324)	-0.014 (0.211)	-0.124 (0.173)	-0.399 (0.406)
Country population	-0.072 (0.139)	0.022 (0.131)	0.035 (0.048)	0.041 (0.167)	0.100 (0.105)	-0.090 (0.057)	-0.046 (0.136)	0.158 (0.103)	0.060 (0.106)	0.017 (0.053)	-0.050 (0.052)	0.141 (0.117)
GDP (log)	0.289 (0.158)	0.588** (0.185)	0.332** (0.072)	0.110 (0.221)	0.403** (0.133)	-0.017 (0.074)	0.373 (0.191)	0.572** (0.136)	-0.027 (0.118)	0.370** (0.072)	-0.037 (0.072)	0.144 (0.135)
Constant	-20.479** (1.543)	-13.622** (2.352)	-8.283** (0.950)	-19.831** (2.898)	-12.206** (2.101)	-2.619** (0.935)	-11.238** (2.578)	-14.555** (1.942)	-20.073** (1.431)	-8.497** (1.041)	-2.654** (0.890)	-8.473** (1.781)
Observations	9,799	9,799	9,799	9,799	9,799	9,799	9,799	9,799	9,799	9,799	9,799	9,799

Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table III. Multinomial logistic analysis of tactic switching (Movement level)

	<u>From nonviolence to</u>			<u>From violence to</u>			<u>From mix to</u>			<u>From none to</u>		
	violence	mix	none	NV	Mix	none	violence	NV	none	NV	mix	none
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Fragmentation	0.537 (0.483)	0.952** (0.230)	0.577** (0.159)	0.602 (0.337)	1.071** (0.255)	-0.046 (0.173)	0.985** (0.319)	0.930** (0.265)	0.343 (0.273)	0.747** (0.153)	0.013 (0.158)	0.169 (0.269)
Group population	-0.227 (0.277)	0.068 (0.173)	0.239* (0.112)	0.042 (0.276)	0.053 (0.160)	-0.112 (0.087)	0.087 (0.234)	0.147 (0.159)	0.116 (0.163)	0.182 (0.112)	-0.105 (0.077)	0.078 (0.131)
Independence claim	0.426 (0.736)	0.077 (0.519)	-0.932** (0.253)	1.708 (1.264)	-0.160 (0.338)	0.768** (0.245)	0.068 (0.522)	-0.528 (0.321)	0.094 (0.369)	-0.934** (0.266)	0.677** (0.234)	-0.029 (0.408)
Concentration	12.746** (0.561)	0.133 (0.642)	-0.520 (0.312)	14.678** (0.594)	1.704 (1.116)	0.219 (0.563)	0.450 (0.941)	14.661** (0.468)	15.209** (0.400)	-0.396 (0.313)	0.351 (0.490)	1.125 (0.931)
Active civil war	-0.894 (1.085)	-1.743* (0.682)	-2.125** (0.597)	-16.020** (0.556)	1.473** (0.341)	-0.550 (0.326)	-2.782* (1.103)	1.337** (0.384)	-1.593* (0.790)	-2.285** (0.608)	0.072 (0.218)	-0.655 (0.610)
Democracy	-1.266 (0.984)	-0.865 (0.487)	0.508 (0.303)	-1.118 (0.979)	-1.151** (0.395)	-0.423 (0.280)	-0.444 (0.518)	-1.186** (0.426)	-0.166 (0.424)	0.160 (0.317)	-0.122 (0.246)	-0.499 (0.415)
Country population	0.090 (0.148)	0.053 (0.195)	-0.084 (0.097)	-0.016 (0.235)	0.139 (0.120)	-0.086 (0.100)	0.010 (0.184)	0.122 (0.143)	0.114 (0.131)	-0.067 (0.091)	-0.080 (0.076)	0.298* (0.138)
GDP (log)	0.668* (0.336)	0.184 (0.172)	0.073 (0.114)	0.372 (0.317)	0.242 (0.144)	-0.064 (0.099)	0.020 (0.184)	0.263 (0.146)	-0.197 (0.149)	0.172 (0.123)	-0.163 (0.093)	-0.083 (0.139)
Constant	-23.299** (3.998)	-7.449** (2.689)	-4.699** (1.485)	-24.727** (3.677)	-10.539** (1.958)	-1.314 (1.361)	-6.419* (2.585)	-23.927** (1.846)	-20.547** (1.926)	-5.203** (1.576)	-0.864 (1.271)	-8.591** (2.205)
Observations	3,158	3,158	3,158	3,158	3,158	3,158	3,158	3,158	3,158	3,158	3,158	3,158

Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05